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THE AFTERMATH OF THE CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS
OF 1970: THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
AIR POLLUTION
INTRODUCTION
On December 31, 1970, Congress enacted the Clean Air Amend-
ments,1
 which virtually amended out of existence the Air Quality Act
of 1967,2 the anti-air-pollution law then in force. The Clean Air Amend-
ments of 1970 [hereinafter the Clean Air Act] were primarily the
result of congressional recognition that the cumbersome and time-
consuming procedures under the old Act were simply not adequate
to combat contemporary air pollution.' One of the major changes
effected by the Amendments was the creation, in sections 109 and 110,
of a new system of cooperation between the federal and state govern-
ments, a system that places a pronounced emphasis upon federal in-
volvement. Sections 109 and 110 provide for the establishment of
national ambient air quality standards and their implementation by
the states. Formerly, ambient air quality standards, which were de-
signed to reflect the maximum tolerable amounts of particular identified
air pollutants, were formulated by the states. 4 That approach posed
the possibility of having fifty different sets of standards, each sup-
posedly determining what levels of air pollution were injurious to the
public health and welfare, Section 109 of the new Act transferred the
task of setting the standards to the federal government' and thereby
effected a double advantage: uniform standards across the nation
would prevent powerful industries from intimidating individual states
I Act of Dec. 31, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat, 1676, codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1857 (1970).
2 Act of Nov. 21, 1967, Pub. L, No, 90-148, 81 Stat. 485, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1857 (1970).
In reporting the bill to the House, the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee
stated:
The purpose of the legislation reported unanimously by your committee is
to speed up, expand, and intensify the war against air pollution in the United
States with a view to assuring that the air we breathe throughout the Nation is
wholesome once again. The Air Quality Act of 1967 (Public Law 90-148) and its
predecessor acts have been instrumental in starting us off in this direction. A re-
view of achievements to date, however, make abundantly clear that the strategies
which we have pursued in the war against air pollution have been inadequate
in several important respects, and the methods employed in implementing those
strategies often have been slow and Iess effective than they might have been.
Ff.R. Rep. No. 91-1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1.970), reprinted in U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 5356 (1970). See also Senator Muskie's remarks in 116 Cong. Rec. 32901 (1970):
In the face of citizen concern and corporate resistance, we have learned that
the air pollution problem is more severe, more pervasive, and growing faster
than we had thought. Unless we recognize the crisis and generate a sense of
urgency from that recognition, lead times may melt away without any chance
at all for a rational solution to the air pollution problem.
4 Act of Nov. 21, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 108(c), 81 Stat. 492.
5 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4 (1970).
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with threats of relocation, and the states were relieved of the dif-
ficult and expensive burden of standard-setting and were left free to
devote their resources to the development of plans for the implementa-
tion and enforcement of the new national standards. °
Most significantly, in order to eliminate the waste of time and
effort encountered under prior legislation,/ Congress streamlined the
administration of the Act and wrote in strict deadlines for the establish-
ment of this new implementation program. First, section 109 requires
the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) , 6
the newly created federal agency that administers the Act as well as
most of the other federal environmental legislation, to propose and
promulgate ambient air quality standards within a short period of
time!' These include a "primary" and a "secondary" standard for each
air pollutant that has been identified and for which air quality criteria
have been issued!° A primary standard is a standard of air quality
which must be maintained to protect the public health," while a
secondary standard is a more stringent standard designed to protect
the public welfare!' The standards, which are usually expressed in
simple terms of -x micrograms of a specific pollutant per cubic meter,"
must then be adopted and enforced by the states through the state
implementation plan procedures outlined in section 110.14 The plans
must provide for the implementation, maintenance, and enforcement
of the primary and secondary standards for each identified pollutant
and must do so with a high degree of specificity in order to be approved
by the Administrator!' If a state fails to submit an acceptable plan
8 Hearings on S. 3229, S. 3466, S. 3546 Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pol-
lution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 449 (1970)
(statements of Francis Sargent, Governor of Massachusetts).
7 See note 3 supra.
8 The Environmental Protection Agency was created to administer and coordinate
the bulk of the federal environmental programs. See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35
Fed. Reg. 15623 (1970), set out in 42 U.S.C. § 4-321 (1970).
42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4 (1970).
10 The air quality criteria are not standards themselves, but rather statements de-
signed to reflect "the latest scientific knowledge useful in indicating the kind and extent
of all identifiable effects on public health or welfare which may be expected from the
presence of [an air] pollutant in the ambient air, in varying quantities." Section 108 of
the Clean Air Amendments, 42 U,S.C. § 1857c-3(a) (2) (1970), The Administrator of
the EPA is responsible for issuing the criteria, and he must base the ambient air quality
standards on the criteria. Sections 108-09 of the Clean Air Amendments, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-
3(a)(2), c-4(b) (1970).
11 Section 109 of the Clean Air Amendments, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4(b) (1) (1970).
12 Section 109 of the Clean Air Amendments, 42 U.S.C. 1857c-4(b) (2) (1970).
Examples of dangers to public welfare are given as "injury to agricultural crops and
livestock, damage to and the deterioration of property, and hazards to air and ground
transportation." Section 101 of the Air Quality Act of 1967, as amended, 42 U.S.C. g 1857
(a)(2) (1970).
18 See 40 CFR § 50.4-11 (1972) (standards for sulfur oxides, particulate matter,
carbon monoxide, photochemical oxidants, hydrocarbons, and nitrogen dioxide).
14 42 U.S.C. § I857c-5(a) (1) (1970).
16 Section 110 of the Clean Air Amendments, 42 U.S.C. g 1857c-5(a) (2) (1970),
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of its own within nine months from the promulgation of a standard,
the Administrator must promulgate a federal substitute plan within
another six months.' The stress of the new Act is clearly on expedition
and efficiency.
The national ambient air quality standards and the state imple-
mentation plans thus constitute the general framework within which
all air pollution control is coordinated. The Clean Air Act also provides
other procedures, whereby the Administrator assumes practically all
responsibility for the regulation of certain types of air pollution: these
include pollution created by the construction or relocation of stationary
sources of pollution,' 7
 hazardous pollutants," new motor vehicles,"
motor fuels," and aircraft. 21
 Nonetheless, the implementation program,
controlled by the federal government with required participation on
the part of the states, occupies center stage. The "federalization" of
air pollution control marks a dramatic new effort on the part of Con-
gress to engage in a serious campaign for the preservation of the air
as a national resource."
During the two-year period since the enactment of the Clean
Air Act, almost all the litigation in the federal courts concerning air
pollution has focused on administrative action taken with regard to
the implementation plan program. The two provisions in the Act
that may be invoked by plaintiffs to raise questions concerning the
implementation plan program are section 304,23
 which authorizes citizen
is Section 110 of the Clean Air Amendments, 42 U.S.C. § I857c-5(c) (1970).
17 Section 111 of the Clean Air Amendments, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-6 (1970).
18 Section 112 of the Clean Air Amendments, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-7 (1970). A hazard-
ous air pollutant is one "which in the judgment of the Administrator may cause or con-
tribute to, an increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating
reversible, illness." Id., 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-6(a) (1) (1970).
19 Section 202 of the Clean Air Amendments, 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-1 (1970).
20
 Section 210 of the Clean Air Amendments, 42 U.S.C. § I857f-6c (1970).
21 Section 231 of the Clean Air Amendments, 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-9 (1970).
22 An interesting proposal has been made for an even stronger federal role in air
pollution control: not only would the EPA set the ambient air quality standards, but
Congress should also give the agency responsibility for establishing emission standards
for stationary sources, standards which the states currently establish for themselves as
part of the implementation plan procedure. See Note, Clean Air Act Amendments of
1970: A Congressional Cosmetic, 61 Geo. L.J. 153, 165-87 (1972).
23 Section 304 of the Clean Air Amendments provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), any person may commence a
civil action on his own behalf—
(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any
other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by
the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in
violation of (A) an emission standard or limitation under this Act or
(B) an order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such
a standard or limitation, or
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the
Administrator to perform any act or duty under this Act which is not dis-
cretionary with the Administrator.
The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in
controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such an emission
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suits, and section 307,24 whch delineates the permissible scope of
standard or limitation, or such an order, or to order the Administrator to per-
form such act or duty, as the case may be.
(b) No action may be commenced—
(1) under subsection (a) (1)-
(A) prior to 60 days after the plaintiff has given notice of the violation
(i) to the Administrator, (ii) to the State in which the violation occurs, and
(iii) to any alleged violator of the standard, limitation, or order, or
(B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently prose-
cuting a civil action in a court of the United States or a State to require
compliance with the standard, limitation, or order, but in any such action in
a court of the United States any person may intervene as a matter of right.
(2) under subsection (a) (2) prior to 60 days after the plaintiff has given
notice of such action to the Administrator,
except that such action may be brought. immediately after such notification in
the case of an action under this section respecting a violation of section 112(c)
(1)(B) or an order issued by the Administrator pursuant to section 113(a).
Notice under this subsection shall be given in such manner as the Administrator
shall prescribe by regulation.
(c) (1) Any action respecting a violation by a stationary source of an emis-
sion standard or limitation or an order respecting such standard or limitation
may be brought only in the judicial district in which such source is located.
(2) In such action under this section, the Administrator, if not a party,
may intervene as a matter of right.
(d) The court, in issuing any final order in any action brought pursuant to
subsection (a) of this section, may award costs of litigation (including reasonable
attorney and expert witness fees) to any party, whenever the court determines
such award is appropriate. The court may, if a temporary restraining order or
preliminary injunction is sought, require the filing of a bond or equivalent se-
curity in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
(e) Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class
of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of
any emission standard or limitation or to seek any other relief (including relief
against the Administrator or a State agency).
(f) For purposes of this section, the term "emission standard or limitation
under this Act" means—
(1) a schedule or timetable of compliance, emission limitation, standard
of performance or emission standard; or
(2) a control or prohibition respecting a motor vehicle fuel or fuel
additive,
which is in effect under this Act (including a requirement applicable by reason of
section 118) or under an application implementation plan.
42 U.S.C.	 1857h-2 (1970).
24 Section .307 of the Clean Air Amendments provides in pertinent part:
(b) (1) A petition for review of action of the Administrator in promul-
gating any national primary or secondary ambient air quality standard, any
emission standard under section 112, any standard of performance under section
111, any standard under section 202 (other than a standard required to be pre-
scribed under section 202(b) (1)), any determination under section 202(b) (5),
any control or prohibition under section 211, or any standard under section 231
may be filed only in the United States' Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia. A petition for review of the Administrator's action in approving or
promulgating any implementation plan 'under section 110 or section 111(d)
may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the appropriate
circuit. Any such petition shall be filed within 30 days from the date of such
promulgation or approval, or after such date if such petition is based solely
on grounds arising after such 30th day.
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judicial review of administrative action under the Act. This comment
will analyze the litigation in which these sections of the Act have been
used as a basis of jurisdiction and will attempt to assess the outcome
of each individual case in terms of its corollation with the congressional
intent underlying the two provisions. It will be submitted that the
courts should beware of the possible consequences of assuming juris-
diction under these provisions without first evaluating the purposes of
the provisions in terms of the overall scheme of the Clean Air Act.
The citizen suit provision in section 304 is especially susceptible to
an overly broad interpretation regarding its authorization of citizen
suits against the Administrator of the EPA. That interpretation will
be examined, along with the threat of serious dangers that an indis-
criminate use of section 304 would pose to a desirable relationship
between the EPA and the courts, Other procedural issues, which may
affect the judicial treatment given to the Clean Air Act and thus have
a bearing on the success or failure of the Act as a comprehensive pro-
gram of cooperation between the federal and the state and local govern-
ments, will then be discussed. Two substantive issues which arose in
conjunction with a court's consideration of essentially procedural
matters will also be examined: one, resolved by the court's finding that
the policy of nondegradation is inherent in the Clean Air Act, is of
major significance. Finally, a section of the comment will be devoted
to the efforts of litigants to use the federal court system as a forum
for the hearing of environmental claims for which the Clean Air Act
makes no explicit provision.
I. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
UNDER THE CLEAN Am ACT
Section 307 of the Clean Air Act specifically provides for judicial
review of the EPA Administrator's approval or disapproval of state
implementation plans and of his promulgation of substitute federal
plans. The provision limits review to the United States Court of
Appeals for the appropriate circuit and that a petition for
such review be filed within thirty days from the date of promulga-
tion or approval of the contested implementation plan'
A. The Circumvention of Section 307 Judicial Review
In two recent cases, plaintiffs who had failed to bring a timely
suit under section 307, or who could not utilize the provision because
the plan they challenged had not yet been promulgated, sought to
(2) Action of the Administrator with respect to which review could have
been obtained under paragraph (1) shall not be subject to judicial review in
civil or criminal proceedings for enforcement.
42 U.S.C. § 185713-5(b) (1970).
26 Section 307 of the Clean Air Amendments, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(1) (1970),
quoted in note 24 supra.
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circumvent the limitations of that section and use other means to
challenge the Administrator's actions on certain implementation plans.
It is submitted that in one case the court erred in assuming jurisdiction
outside the scope of section 307, and that the court in the second
case correctly perceived that Congress intended to restrict judicial re-
view under the Act, and consequently refused jurisdiction.
In Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus," the Montana Board of Health
had formulated an implementation plan including a regulation that would
have substantially reduced the amount of sulfur oxides emitted from
the plaintiff's copper smelting plant in that state. The Governor of
Montana submitted the plan to the EPA for approval, but first deleted
the emission limitation for sulfur oxides. The Administrator of the
EPA disapproved the plan, principally because of the absence of a
sulfur oxide emission limitation, and, pursuant to his duty under sec-
tion 110(c) of the Act, proposed an implementation plan to remedy this
defect." Anaconda petitioned the District Court for the District of
Colorado for a preliminary injunction forbidding the Administrator
to enforce the new emission limitation." Jurisdiction was unsuccessfully
challenged on the ground that section 307 was the exclusive means
for seeking judicial review of implementation plans." Noting that
section 307 review was as yet unavailable to the plaintiff because the
EPA had not yet promulgated the proposed replacement implementa-
tion plan, the court held that it had jurisdiction to consider the case
and granted a preliminary injunction."
Initially, it is difficult to comprehend why the temporary un-
availability of section 307 review should provide justification for the
district court's assumption of jurisdiction in an area which—according
to the congressional declaration in section 307—properly belongs to
the circuit courts. The district court relied heavily upon its findings
concerning the multimillion dollar program which Anaconda had in-
stituted to control its emissions. It was found that Anaconda had al-
ready expended $16 million on a $31 million program which it had
adopted to achieve a forty percent reduction of its emissions—a reduc-
tion which Anaconda, in its own judgment, had decided was sufficient
to comply with the ambient air quality standard for sulfur oxide. 81
The EPA had then decided that a much stricter emission limitation,
one which would result in an eighty-nine percent reduction in emissions,
was necessary to meet the air quality standard and had included that
limitation in its proposal plan." The court concluded that Anaconda's
current expenditure of $16 million would be wasted since its program,
which was designed to achieve a forty percent reduction of emissions,
26 352 F. Supp. 697 (D. Colo. 1972).
27 The proposed plan appears in 37 Fed. Reg. 15102 (1972).
28 352 F. Supp. at 699.
29 Id. at 702.
80 Id. at 708, 714.
81 Id. at 709.
82 Id. at 701.
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could in no way be used to meet the EPA's proposed eighty-nine per-
cent reduction."
It would appear, however, that even if the program was so in-
adequate as to be useless in meeting the more stringent emission
limitation, Anaconda's past expenditure did not constitute an irreparable
injury. The money was already spent. If the EPA's proposed emission
limitation was so unnecessarily strict as to amount to an unjustified
"taking" of the $16 million expended, that issue could have been
litigated in a section 307 suit once the limitation was promulgated.
Although the court intimated that Anaconda had to proceed post haste
to meet the "law's" deadline," Anaconda was not in fact currently
required by law to continue its program. Moreover, the company was
not currently exposed to any enforcement proceedings, brought either
by the EPA or through a citizen suit," since the emission limitation
was as yet only proposed. The proposed emission limitation would not
become law until it was promulgated," and Anaconda could not have
been faulted for waiting for final promulgation of the regulation before
continuing with or modifying its reduction program. Once the regula-
tion was promulgated, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
would have had jurisdiction under section 307 and could have issued
the injunctive relief necessary to protect Anaconda had the Adminis-
trator been arbitrary or capricious in demanding immediate or un-
realistically early compliance. It is therefore submitted that one of the
prerequisites for equity jurisdiction, a showing of present or future
irreparable harm, was apparently lacking.
The district court nonetheless decided that it had jurisdiction
based upon two grounds: first, the citizen suit provision of section
304; second, "the somewhat discretionary grounds" enunciated by the
Supreme Court in certain landmark administrative law cases." These
grounds will be discussed seriatim.
1. The Apparent Conflict Between Section 307 and Judicial Review
and Section 304 Citizen Suits
As to the first ground, the court sought to apply the proposition
established in Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus 38
 that the district courts may
exercise jurisdiction over issues raised in section 304 citizen suits
despite the fact that those issues, if raised later, would have to be
33
 Id. at 701-02.
84
 Id. at 709.
35 Under § 113 of the Act, the Administrator is authorized to enforce requirements
of the Act through compliance orders and civil actions, subject to limitations. 42 U.S.C.
1857c-8(a)-(b) (1970). Penalties in the form of fines or imprisonment may also be
imposed. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(c) (1970). Under § 304 of the Act, a person has the
option of suing an alleged violator of the Act or of suing the EPA Administrator to
compel him to enforce the requirements against the alleged violator. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2
(a) (1) (1970).
86 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(d) (1910).
37 352 F. Supp. at 708.
38 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972).
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heard by the circuit courts in section 307 proceedings." This may be
true, but it is first necessary to determine whether Anaconda's petition
should be classified as a citizen suit under section 304. The applicable
subsection provides that "any person may commence a civil action on
his own behalf . . . against the Administrator where there is alleged
a failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this
chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator."" Ana-
conda's complaint was based primarily on the failure of the Admin-
istrator to fulfill two allegedly nondiscretionary duties: first, the duty
to allow cross-examination of Government witnesses at the administra-
tive hearings at which the proposed emission limitation was con-
sidered; 41 and second, the duty to file a "NEPA statement."" Neither
of these "duties" are duties imposed upon the Administrator by the
Clean Air Act, and consequently they cannot support a district court's
assumption of jurisdiction under section 304. The wording of that
section states explicitly that the unperfomed duty must arise under
the Act. This is not necessarily to imply that the EPA Administrator
may refuse to allow cross-examination at administrative hearings or
that he is not required to file NEPA statements. The language does,
however, require the conclusion that failure to perform such duties
is not a proper subject for suit under section 304 of the Act.
In Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, the plaintiffs alleged that the
Administrator had violated the duty imposed upon him by section
101(b) of the Act.' That section sets out the purposes of the Act;
included as an aim is the desire "to protect and enhance the quality
of the Nation's air resources."" The alleged violation consisted of
the EPA's announced policy of approving state implementation plans
although the plans permitted the degradation of pure air as long as
that degradation did not pollute the air beyond the limits set by the
national ambient air quality standards." The Sierra Club court found
that the complaint raised a question of a violation of a nondiscretionary
duty under the Act, and therefore held that it had jurisdiction under
section 304." In contrast, the only transgression of the Clean Air Act
on the part of the Administrator which Anaconda could allege was
the fact that the Administrator failed to take into account the addi-
tional pollution problems that Anaconda's compliance with the new
emission limitation would supposedly create.' In other words, it was
30 Id. at 254.
40 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2 (a) (2) (1970) (emphasis added).
41 352 F. Supp. at 702.
42 Id. at 710. The environmental impact statements required by § 102 of the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970), otherwise known as
"NEPA statements," are discussed in the text accompanying notes 81-95 infra.
43 344 F. Supp. at 253, 254.
44 42 U.S.C. § 1857(b)(1) (1970) (emphasis added).
45 344 F. Supp. at 254, 256.
40 Id. at 256.
47 The court agreed with Anaconda's allegation and referred specifically to "problems
of water pollution, solid waste disposal problems and air pollution problems having to
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the Administrator's judgment in formulating this particular regulation
that Anaconda challenged." Should other courts accept this argument,
one would be hard-pressed to conceive of any situation involving the
judgment and expertise of the Administrator which would not be a
proper subject for action under section 304. Such an expansive reading
of the scope of section 304, it is submitted, would effectively destroy
the two safeguards of EPA action which Congress formulated in sec-
tion 307: the thirty-day limitation to compel an immediate and final
resolution of any dispute concerning the Administrator's actions in
reference to implementation plans, and the exclusive jurisdiction of
the circuit courts to ensure that such resolution be uniform.
The solution to the problem of where to demarcate the boundary
between section 304 and section 307 appears to lie in the definition of
what constitutes a non-discretionary duty under section 304. While
the Sierra Club case dealt with the abstract question of whether the
Administrator did or did not have a duty to insist that implementation
plans guard against the degradation of existing air quality, such a
question was not raised in Anaconda. The Administrator was ad-
mittedly under a duty to promulgate the emission limitation for
Montana since the state had failed to do so, and he was in the pro-
cess of fulfilling that duty. In contrast, the dispute in Anaconda raised
only the relative question of how well the Administrator was per-
forming that duty. Had Anaconda alleged a failure on the part of
the Administrator to perform a non-discretionary duty arising under
the Act, it would have been justified in bringing a citizen suit, since
section 304 authorizes "any person" to bring such a suit, and, as the
court in Anaconda observed, one need not be a private party motivated
by purely altruistic ends to qualify." What should disqualify Anaconda
is not its status but the cause of its complaint: it did not seek to
require the Administrator to perform some duty under the Act but
to question his judgment in setting a standard involving an 89%,
rather than a 40%, reduction of emissions. Such a question, regarding
an abuse of discretion, should properly be brought under section 307.
Section 304, on the other hand, should apply only to cases where the
Administrator is alleged to have clearly failed to perform a duty under
the Act.
Furthermore, as the legislative history of the Clean Air Act dem-
onstrates, the congressional intent underlying that section was to per-
do with the quarrying, transportation and the hauling of limestone and other similar
materials" which it foresaw would arise should the proposed plan be promulgated. The
court found that these problems were "directly related to the resultant production of a
staggering quantity of unsalable sulfuric acid which would threaten water pollution."
352 F. Supp. at 702.
48 More specifically, the issue raised was whether an emission reduction for sulfur
oxides of 89% was necessary to protect the public welfare, or whether a less stringent
reduction of 40% would have been adequate. Id. at 701.
40 Id. at 708.
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mit the use of citizen suits to assist in the enforcement of the Act."
The ironic result of the Anaconda decision is that it would permit pol-
lutors, those against whom enforcement proceedings are threatened, to
invoke the jurisdiction of local district courts to thwart that enforce-
ment. The substantive claims made by Anaconda were perhaps legiti-
mate;". nevertheless, under the Act the proper place for those claims to
be heard is the appropriate circuit court; the proper time, within thirty
days after the promulgation of the contested regulation. Congress em-
bodied these limitations in section 307 with the deliberate purpose of
protecting EPA action from attack in any court at any time, and an
overbroad reading of section 304 will destroy that protection.
2. Other Possibilities of Judicial Review
The alternative basis upon which the Anaconda court found juris-
diction was the "somewhat discretionary grounds"" doctrine enun-
ciated by the Supreme Court in McKart v. United States," and in the
companion cases of Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner," Toilet Goods
Ass'n, Inc. v. Gardner," and Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass'n, Inc." The
McKart case is immediately distinguishable from Anaconda. It dealt
simply with the proposition that in certain instances, notwithstanding
the customary requirement that exhaustion of administrative remedies
must precede judicial review of administrative action," judicial review
may be available to a party who has failed to exhaust all administrative
remedies." Anaconda, however, was concerned not with the question
whether all administrative remedies provided by statute must be first
exhausted, but with the issue whether the judicial review explicitly
provided by statute is exclusive. The decision in McKart, a Selective
Service Act prosecution, was motivated by the fact that insistence upon
an exhaustion of administrative remedies would have been unduly
harsh, since it was a criminal case, especially in light of the fact that
the agency involved had no reason to fear disruption of its administra-
tive procedure because of litigants preferring to seek premature ju-
50 S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 36-39 (1970). See also 116 Cong. Rec.
32926-27 (Senator Muskie's comments). Section 304 originated as a Senate amendment
to a House bill. Conference Rep. No. 91-1783, 9Ist Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 5374, 5388 (1970).
61 The court found, inter alia, that the testing methods upon which the strict emis-
sion limitation in the proposed plan was ultimately based were dependent upon faulty
equipment. 352 F. Supp. at 701.
52
 Id. at 708.
53
 395 U.S. 185 (1969).
54 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
56 387 U.S. 158 (1967).
60 387 U.S. 167 (1967).
57 Myers v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938).
58 Petitioner McKart, who had previously received a draft classification of IV-A
(sole surviving son status) from the Selective Service Board, was reclassified I-A (avail-
able for military service). He did not appeal the reclassification through the available
administrative procedures and failed to report for induction when ordered to do so. He
was tried for this failure. 395 U.S. at 185, 193-97.
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dicial review." The EPA, on the other hand, has every reason to fear
a district court's liberal assumption of "discretionary" jurisdiction: no
longer would the agency be able to depend upon judicial review of its
plans being restricted to the prompt and uniform treatment in the cir-
cuit courts afforded by section 307 of the Clean Air Act.
In Abbott Laboratories and the two Toilet Goods cases which
were decided in accordance with that case, the Supreme Court held
that courts should not restrict access to judicial review of administra-
tive decisions unless there is a showing by "clear and convincing evi-
dence" of a contrary legislative intent." The Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act," which applied in all three cases, was silent as to what
review was available for the contested issues. The fact that the statute
provided for specific review of other issues was held not to support
the inference that no review at all was to be allowed for the issues in-
volved in the cases." The Court therefore decided" that it could exer-
cise jurisdiction and grant pre-enforcement review of the regulations
under the authority of the Administrative Procedure Act" and the
Declaratory Judgment Act."
Unlike the statutory scheme in the Abbott Laboratories and Toilet
Goods cases, however, section 307 of the Clean Air Act is quite explicit
in its delimitation of the judicial review permitted for the kind of issue
presented in Anaconda. Review of the Administrator's promulgation of
an implementation plan may be had only in the appropriate circuit
court within thirty days after promulgation. Thus, the "discretionary"
jurisdiction endorsed in Abbott Laboratories is inapplicable to the situ-
ation in Anaconda since there is clear and convincing evidence that
Congress intended to foreclose review in most cases through the pro-
visions of section 307.
If the federal courts follow the rationale of Anaconda Co. v. Ruc-
kelshaus, the administrative efficiency of the EPA may well be crippled
by its consequent exposure to a court-created discretionary review as
well as to the review that Congress specifically provided in section 307.
0 0
 Id. at 199-200.
60 387 U.S. at 141.
61 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1970).
62
 387 U.S. at 140-41. Accord, Toilet Goods Ass'n, Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. at
160; Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass'n, Inc., 387 U.S. at 168.
68
 Id. In Toilet Goods Ass'n, Inc. v. Gardner, however, the Court declined to exercise
the jurisdiction which it asserted it possessed since the issues were not ripe for adjudication
under the standards elaborated in the Abbott Laboratories case. For those standards to
be met, it is necessary that (1) the issues tendered be appropriate for judicial resolution,
and (2) excessive hardship be placed upon the parties by the denial of judicial relief at
that stage. 387 U.S. at 148-49. Even if the Anaconda court's assertion of jurisdiction were
well-founded, it would seem that that case also is not ripe for adjudication since the
second standard would not be satisfied. It does not appear from a reading of the opinion
that Anaconda would have suffered any greater hardship if it had been required to wait
until § 307 review was available. See text accompanying notes 31-36 supra.
04 5 U.S.C. § 701-04 (1970).
66 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970).
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It is significant to note that the EPA has a mere six months in which to
promulgate a substitute implementation plan for a state that fails to
submit an acceptable plan." If section 307 is regarded as an exclusive
means of review, absent extraordinary circumstances, the Administra-
tor should encounter no difficulty in meeting the strict deadline. But
if Anaconda is followed, and proposed regulations which are being for-
mulated as a substitute implementation plan are opened to challenge,
it is more than likely that the Administrator will be unable to meet
the statutory deadlines. For example, in Anaconda, the Administrator
should have promolgated the emission limitation for sulfur oxides by
July 31, 1972," but apparently no plan had been promulgated as of
the date of the decision, December 19, 1972." It may be surmised that
the delay was caused at least in part by Anaconda's suit, and that the
effect of the Anaconda court's orders" will cause even further delay. In
sum, according to Anaconda those who may be affected by EPA regula-
tions will have two opportunities, before as well as after promulgation,
to challenge those regulations." It is submitted that such a result is
unwarranted: absent extraordinary circumstances—circumstances
which do not appear in Anaconda—there should be no reason for grant-
ing premature judicial review of EPA action, especially when such
review militates against the purpose of the Clean Air Amendments of
1970, the expeditious establishment of air pollution standards.
B. Section 307 Viewed as an Exclusive Provision
for Judicial Review
At this point it would be appropriate to compare the Anaconda
decision with Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckelshaus," in which the Third Cir-
cuit reached a contrary result in a substantially similar factual situa-
tion. The Delaware state government had submitted to the EPA an
implementation plan which included a regulation limiting the sulfur
content of fuel burned in a certain area of the state. After the Admin-
istrator of the EPA approved the plan, the Getty Oil Co. applied to
state administrative authorities for a variance, but failed to bring a
petition for review of the Adminstrator's action in approving the plan
within the thirty-day period established in section 307. Following the
necessary procedure," the Administrator issued the compliance order
66 42 U.S.C.	 1857c-5(c) (1970).
07 See note 123 infra.
°8 352 F. Supp. at 697.
66 The court ordered the Administrator to hold an adjudicatory hearing and to pro-
vide the plaintiff with a right to subpoena witnesses and to cross-examine government
witnesses; it also ordered him to file a NEPA statement. Id. at 714-15.
70 This must be, of course, within the bounds of res judicata.
71 467 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1972).
72 Section 113 of the Act provides in pertinent part:
Whenever, on the basis of any information available to him, the Administrator
finds that any person is in violation of any requirement of an applicable imple-
mentation plan, the Administrator shall notify the person in violation of the
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which was the subject of this suit. The Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that Getty's failure to file a section 307 appeal barred its
district court suit to enjoin the Administrator from enforcing the con-
tested regulation." The court stated flatly that the Declaratory Judg-
ment Act and the Administrative Procedure Act could not afford a
basis for jurisdiction.' Section 307 review must be regarded as the
sole remedy available to the plaintiff, notwithstanding the absence of
the word "exclusive" in section 307, since Congress's purpose in draft-
ing that section was clear.75 Although the Getty court indicated its
awareness of the admonition in Abbott Laboratories to be wary of re-
stricting judicial review unless there is clear and convincing evidence
of a contrary legislative intent, the court concluded that its decision
was compelled by the legislative purpose underlying section 307."
Getty's substantive claims, which were similar to Anaconda's,
rested on two grounds: first, the fact that the relevant national primary
ambient air standard had already been achieved in the area rendered
the regulation unnecessary, and second, that compliance with the regu-
lation, at least prior to the development of an alternative technology,
would impose an unreasonable hardship upon the plaintiff." The court's
responses to these arguments, though dicta because jurisdiction was
denied, are noteworthy. The first objection, that the attainment of the
national standards makes further regulation unnecessary, was met with
the observation that section 110 of the Clean Air Act requires that
implementation plans meet those standards but it does not preclude
those standards from being exceeded. 78 That is, the federal government
had not preempted the field of air pollution control with the passage of
the Clean Air Act: the state and local governments must provide pro-
grams sufficient to satisfy the minimal requirements of the national
ambient air quality standards in order to protect and enhance the qual-
ity of the air as a national resource. They are explicitly left free, how-
ever, to impose standards higher than the minimum federal goals."
Secondly, the court in Getty regarded the oft-heard excuse—that the
present state of technology is insufficient to make compliance possible
—as unacceptable in light of the fact that the Act says nothing about
deferring compliance for that reason alone."
plan and the State in which the plan applies of such finding. If such violation
extends beyond the 30th day after the date of the Administrator's notification,
the Administrator may issue an order requiring such person to comply with the
requirements of such plan . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(a)(1) (1970).
78 467 F.2d at 358.
74 Id. at 356.
78 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 355, 358.
78 Id.
76 42 U.S.C. 11857d-1 (1970).
60 Id. at 359.
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C. The "NEPA Statement" Requirement and the EPA
An additional tactic was employed by the plaintiffs in both Ana-
condas' and Getty82 to circumvent section 307's restrictive review pro-
visions: they contended that the EPA, like all other federal agencies,
is obligated to file environmental impact statements pursuant to the
National Environmental Policy Act" (hereinafter "NEPA"), and that
the EPA's failure to do so in their cases conferred jurisdiction upon
the district courts to enjoin EPA action until the NEPA requirements
were fulfilled.
Again the two courts split. The circuit court in Getty maintained
that even if the EPA were subject to NEPA requirements (a position
about which the court had serious doubts), such an issue is properly
raised in a section 307 proceeding." The court's conclusion is necessary
to prevent section 307 from becoming a dead letter provision: were
it otherwise, a pollutor threatened with enforcement proceedings could
bring his challenge to EPA action in a district court and beyond the
thirty-day limitation, thereby frustrating the restrictive provisions of
sections 307.
The district court in Anaconda ignored Getty's holding that the
NEPA issue, along with all the other issues raised, could be properly
examined only within the bounds of a section 307 review, and it dis-
missed as mere dicta the doubts expressed in Getty as to whether
NEPA applied to the EPA at all." As far as the Anaconda court was
concerned, the problem could be reduced to a pure syllogism, the major
premise, that all federal agencies must file NEPA statements, together
with the minor premise, that the EPA is a federal agency, necessarily
implying that the EPA must file NEPA statements."
This simplistic reasoning, it is submitted, frustrates the intent of
section 307 of the Clean Air Act, exceeds the mandate of NEPA, and
81 352 F. Supp. at 710.
82 467 F,2d at 359.
88 The basic purpose of NEPA is to ensure that the executive branch of the federal
government will perform its functions in accordance with a national policy for the useful
conservation of the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970). To accomplish this goal, all
federal agencies, to the fullest extent possible, are required to:
include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and
other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human en-
vironment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the
proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment
and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would
be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1970).
84 467 F.2d at 359.
88 352 F. Supp. at 710.
86 Id. at 713.
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will impose an intolerable burden upon the EPA should it be followed
by the other district courts. First, under section 102 of NEPA as cur-
rently interpreted by several circuits, jurisdiction lies in the district
courts not only to require agencies to follow NEPA's procedures for
the filing of statements and consultation with other agencies, but also
to determine whether the substantive requirements of NEPA have been
met.87
 Thus, if NEPA is applied to the EPA, a pollutor threatened with
enforcement proceedings will be able to challenge the substantive con-
tent of the applicable regulation and thereby circumvent the restrictive
review provisions of section 307. Second, it appears anomalous to re-
quire the EPA, the agency which is charged with the administration of
almost all the federal environmental programs" and which is usually
consulted by the other, nonenvironmental agencies when filing their
NEPA statements," to file statements itself. This position is supported
by the operative language of the NEPA section that provides for the
filing of statements: agencies must file statements only when their
administrative actions can be described as "major Federal actions sig-
nificantly affecting the quality of the human environment." 9° Common
sense seems to dictate that the effect meant by the words "significantly
affecting" be a potentially deleterious one. Naturally, most agencies
should not be permitted to avoid the mandate of NEPA by claiming
that a particular action will enhance the quality of the environment;
after all, they are principally dedicated to purposes other than environ-
mental protection, and the alleged enhancement may be debatable."
Where, however, the agency involved has as its primary purpose the
improvement of the environment, and where it has been established to
provide the judgment and expertise necessary to fulfill that purpose, it
87 Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir.
1972). "[This conclusion] is supported by the District of Columbia Circuit, the Second
Circuit and the Fourth Circuit, and by the analogous decision of the Supreme Court
in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 .. . (1971). .. ." Id.
at 299-300 (footnotes omitted), citing Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC,
449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Scenic Hudson Preserv. Conf. v. FPC, 453 F.2d
463, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1138-39 (4th Cir. 1971). Contra, National Helium Corp. v.
Morton, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1972).
42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
88 Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15623 (1970), set out in 42
U.S.C.	 4321 (1970).
80 Section 316 of the Clean Air Amendments provides in pertinent part:
The Administrator shall review and comment in writing on the environmental im-
pact of any matter relating to duties and responsibilities granted pursuant to this
chapter or other provisions of the authority of the Administrator, contained in
... any major Federal agency action ... to which section 4332(2)(c) [NEPA]
of this title applies . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1857h-7(a) (1970).
ft0 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1970).
91 See, e.g., Kalur v. Resor, 355 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1971), in which the Army
Corps of Engineers was held subject to NEPA despite its assertion that since the Corps
is an agency dedicated to guarding the environment, the provisions of NEPA do not
apply to it. Id. at 12-13.
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should not be hamstrung through the imposition of unnecessary pro-
cedural requirements 0 2
 The legislative history of NEPA, though not
conclusive, demonstrates that Congress was aware of a possible con-
flict and did not intend that the relevant language of NEPA be as all-
inclusive as it seems at first glance." And alternatively, if the adminis-
trative actions of the EPA are to be regarded as "significantly affecting
the quality of the human environment," the EPA will be compelled to
file NEPA statements for almost all of its regulatory activity" since
that activity is certainly of "major" significance. Congress's hopes of
creating a smoothly functioning environmental agency may well be
dashed. Mr. William Ruckelshaus, the present Administrator of the
EPA, has expressed his reaction to this aspect of the Anaconda decision:
"We have concluded that it would be administratively impossible to
prepare a statement on every last standard and regulation proposed by
the agency. Also, in most cases it would be an unnecessary duplication
92 The Getty court opined that the EPA already observes many of the NEPA re-
quirements through the agency's own administrative procedures under the Clean Air
Act: "[T]he Administrator is given the responsibility of making policy reviews under
42 U.S.C. § 1857h-7, annual comprehensive economic cost studies under 42 U.S.C. §
1857j-1, and periodic reports to Congress under section 1857j-2. It Is apparent that
the Clean Air Act itself contains sufficient provisions for the achievement of those goals
to be attained by NEPA." 467 F.2d at 359.
08 During Senate debate on NEPA, Senator Jackson introduced a memorandum of
the Conference Committee entitled "Major Changes in S. 1075 As Passed by the Senate."
115 Cong. Rec. 40416 (1969). It stated: "Many existing agencies such as the National
Park Service, the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration and the National Aid
[sic] Pollution Control Administration already have important responsibilities in the
area of environmental control. The provision of Section 102 (as well as 103) are [sic]
not designed to result in any change in the manner in which they carry out their environ-
mental protection authority." Id, at 40417-18, Senator Muskie, a member of the Con-
ference Committee, stated more explicitly: "With regard to the environmental improve-
ment agencies such as the Federal Water Improvement Administration and the Air
Quality Administration, it is clearly understood that those agencies will operate on the
basis of the legislative charter that has been created and is not modified in any way by
S. 1075 [NEPAL" Id. at 40425. The Federal Water Pollution Control Administration
and the National Air Pollution Control Administration were later incorporated into the
newly-created EPA as its principal components. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, § 2,
supra note 88. The agency which administers NEPA, the Council on Environmental
Quality, felt that this legislative history established that the EPA need not file NEPA
statements and so ruled. 35 Fed. Reg. 7390, 7391 (1970). At least one commentator has
also subscribed to the view that the EPA is not bound by NEPA. See Donovan, The
Federal Government and Environmental Control: Administrative Reform on the Execu-
tive Level, 12 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 541, 549 (1971).
a4 The EPA has been specifically exempted from the duty to file NEPA state-
ments regarding certain actions it undertakes in administering the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1371(c)(1) (Sapp. 1973). Debate in Congress on
this Act resurrected the issue of whether the EPA is bound at all by NEPA. See note
93 supra. On the floor of the Senate, Senator Muskie said:
„ it was clearly intended at the time Congress enacted NEPA that environ-
mental regulatory agencies such as those authorized by the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act and the Clean Air Act would not be subject to NEPA's provi-
sions. The Senator [Sen. Jackson] and I had discussions on this point, and it
was clearly understood, from the colloquies in the [Congressional Record] on
the subject it is clear, that it was the intention of NEPA to put mission-oriented
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of effort because agency procedures already call for a thorough analysis
of the environmental consequences of our proposals.""
D. The Use of Section 307 to Review the Promulgation
of National Air Standards
Section 307 also provides for the judicial review of action of the
Administrator in promulgating any national primary or secondary am-
bient air quality standard." Again, the petition for review must be filed
within thirty days after the date of the contested action. Since the stan-
dards are of national concern, jurisdiction is vested only in the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia.' In Kennecott Copper Corp.
v. EPA," the plaintiff brought a section 307 action to question the basis
of the Administrator's action in promulgating the national secondary
ambient air quality standard for sulfur oxides. Section 109, the perti-
nent provision, requires the EPA Administrator to propose and promul-
gate national air standards "based on" the air quality criteria for each
pollutant." Air quality criteria are simply defined as statements re-
flecting the "latest scientific knowledge useful in indicating the kind
and extent of all identifiable effects on public health or welfare which
may be expected from the presence of such pollutant in the ambient air,
in varying quantities."1°° The criteria which were previously published
for sulfur oxides referred to no effects detrimental to the public welfare
at levels below eighty-five micrograms per cubic meter. The Adminis-
trator nonetheless proposed the considerably more stringent standard
of sixty micrograms per cubic meter of the pollutant. The court de-
clined to rule on the record as it was thus presented, but remanded it
to the Administrator for him "to supply an implementing statement
that will enlighten the court as to the basis on which he reached the 60
standard from the material in the Criteria."'"
agencies, not the environmental enhancement agencies, under an environmental
structure and that the environmental enhancement or improvement agencies such
as the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration and the Clean Air Act
would not be subject to NEPA's provisions.
118 Cong. Rec. S16885 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1972). But see 118 Cong. Rec. H10271 (daily
ed. Oct. 18, 1972) where Representative Dingell flatly opposed Senator Muskie's inter-
pretation. However, even under Representative Dingell's strict interpretation, NEPA state-
ments would not be required of the EPA "at the enforcement stage." The Getty decision
was cited as authority for that position. Id.
95 3 BNA Env. Rep., Current Devs. 1018 (Jan. 5, 1973).
90 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b) (1) (1970), quoted in note 24 supra.
97 Id.
08 462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
99 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4 (1970).
700 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-3(a)(2) (1970).
701 462 F.2d at 850. The Circuit Court for the District of Columbia has recently re-
manded another case to the Administrator for fuller consideration. In International
Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, the plaintiff auto-makers utilized § 307 to seek review
of the Administrator's determination not to grant them an extension of one year for
compliance with § 202 motor vehicle emission standards. The court held that the
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More important than the actual result in Kennecott is its expres-
sion of the philosophy of judicial review that the circuit court found
inherent in the Clean Air Act. While the court did require further in-
formation from the Administrator in order to determine whether his
actions embodied an abuse of discretion or error of law, it stressed that
it was doing so in the spirit of a "partnership."' Further, the court
stated that it was "keenly aware of the need to avoid procedural strait
jackets that would seriously hinder this new agency in the discharge of
the novel, sensitive and formidable, tasks entrusted to it by Con-
gress."'" In this vein, the court rejected Kennecott's alternative cause
of action that the EPA had failed to fulfill a requirement of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act (APA). According to section 4 of the APA,
which admittedly applies to the EPA, every agency must incorporate
into the regulations which it issues a "concise general statement" of
their "basis and purpose."'" The court in Kennecott could have given
a strict construction to this statutory requirement in order to reach the
result which it did, but the effect of such a decision would have been
to bind the EPA to file separate statements regarding each discrete
action within its regulatory activity. Such an absolute approach was
avoided by the court's holding that the regulation contained in itself a
sufficient exposition of its basis and purpose to satisfy the legislative
minimum of the APA. 1" The court explained: "Particularly as applied
to environmental regulations, produced under the tension of need for
reasonable expedition and need for resolution of a host of nagging prob-
lems, we are loath to stretch the requirement of a 'general statement'
into a mandate for reference to all the specific issues raised in com-
ments."'" The remand was ordered not on the grounds that it was re-
quired by the APA, but in the interest of justice and in aid of the judi-
cial function, centralized in that court, of expeditious disposition of the
challenge to the standard.'"
The attitude of the court in Kennecott in avoiding the placing of
procedural restrictions on the EPA contrasts markedly with the holding
in Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus 108 that the EPA is subject to NEPA.
Even if NEPA were applicable to the EPA, the court in the Anaconda
case was not compelled to bind the EPA to the procedural requirement
of filing NEPA statements in such a literal fashion. The Anaconda court,
in a fashion similar to the Kennecott court, could have found that the
EPA had constructively complied with NEPA since the administrative
plaintiffs had made an apparent showing that technology is not available to meet the
standards by 1975 and that the Administrator had failed to support his opposing position
with a "reasonable presentation." 41 U.S.L.W. 2444 (D.C. Cir., Feb. 10, 1973).
102 462 F.2d at 848-49.
108 Id. at 849.
104 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1970).
1°5 462 F.2d at 850.
10 Id.
107 Id.
102 352 F. Supp. 697 (D. Colo, 1972).
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process whereby the EPA formulates its rules and regulations covers
the same ground that NEPA does."' It is possible, of course, that the
court in Anaconda hesitated to take such a course because its finding of
jurisdiction depended in part on its ruling that the NEPA statement
requirement applied in the case before it.
II. THE CITIZEN SUIT PROVISION OF THE CLEAN An ACT
The citizen suit provision of the Clean Air Act, which caused con-
siderable controversy when it was debated in Congress,' is set forth
in section 304 of the Act." The primary purpose of this section is to
provide for the public's participation in the enforcement of standards
and regulations established under the Act.1 12 Since section 304 is es-
sentially a "public interest" provision, the only remedy available under
it is injunctive relief.' It does not itself provide for the recovery of
property or personal damages, 114 although it does contain a cautionary
"savings clause" which emphasizes that section 304 is not meant to
restrict any other rights particular plaintiffs may have' under the com-
mon law or other statutes.'" Jurisdiction is vested in the federal dis-
trict courts without regard to the amount in controversy or the citizen-
ship of the parties.'
There are two types of section 304 citizen suits. The first may be
brought against any person who is alleged to be in violation of an emis-
sion standard or limitation or an order issued by the EPA Adminis-
trator or a state with respect to such a standard or limitation.' The
second type may be brought against the Administrator himself where
there is alleged a failure on his part to perform a nondiscretionary duty
arising under the Act, including his enforcement duties." The Senate
Committee which first considered this provision anticipated that "many
citizens suits would be of this nature, since such suits would reduce the
ultimate burden on the citizen of going forward with the entire ac-
tion."119 That is, rather than bring a suit of the first type against an
alleged pollutor, a citizen can simply commence an action against the
102 See note 92 supra.
110 See 116 Cong. Rec. 32923-27 (1970).
111 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2 (1970), quoted in note 23 supra.
112 S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1970).
112 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(a) (1970).
114 "There would be no jurisdictional amount required in section 304 nor is there
any provision for the recovery of property or personal damages." S. Rep. No. 91-1196,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1970).
na 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(e) (1970).
116 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(a) (1970).
117 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(a) (1) (1970). In the case of an action respecting a violation
by a stationary source, suit may be brought only in the district court for the district in
which the alleged violation occurred. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(c) (1970).
118 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(a)(2) (1970). See also S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 38-39 (1970).
119 S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1970).
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Administrator to compel him to institute enforcement action against the
pollutor. 12°
To date, there has been a surprising paucity of suits brought
against the Administrator under section 304: there have been no re-
ported cases dealing with the Administrator's enforcement responsibil-
ities and only two cases dealing with his administrative responsibil-
ities.121
 It is expected, however, that in the near future many citizen
suits will be commenced for the purpose of enforcing specific standards
and regulations. 122 The explanation for the present lack of litigation
lies in the fact that in the past two years the EPA has gone through
what might be termed an administrative "tooling-up period." The time-
tables for administrative action set forth in the Act did not require that
standards and regulations be drawn up and promulgated until very
recently.128 For example, most of the regulations which deal with the
control of air pollution generated by stationary sources consist of emis-
sion limitations formulated by the states as part of their implementa-
tion plan procedures.'" The deadline for the Administrator's approval
or disapproval of state implementation plans was May 31, 1972. 125
This section will discuss the substantive issues raised in the two
citizen suits which have been decided, as well as two procedural matters
dealt with in one of the cases. Both involved suits against the Adminis-
trator for his failure to perform nondiscretionary duties imposed by
the Act: the first, Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 12° the duty to support
120 It is
 submitted that the citizen plaintiff would merely have to make a showing
that the Administrator has good cause to proceed against an alleged pollutor and that the
Administrator has unjustifiably failed to do so. The Administrator would then be Ieft
with the more complicated task of proving the complained-of violation. The Adminis-
trator's enforcement duties are set out in § 113, 42 U.S.C. g 1857c-8 (1970).
121 Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd mem., 41
U.S.L.W. 2255 (D.C. Cir., Nov. 1, 1972), cert. granted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3392 (U.S. Jan.
8, 1973) (No. 72-804) ; Riverside v. Ruckelshaus, 4 BNA Env, Rep. Cases 1728 (C.D. Cal.
1972). Additionally one might consider Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 352 F. Supp. 697
(D. Colo. 1972), where the court invoked § 304 as an alternative basis of jurisdiction.
See text accompanying notes 38-51 supra.
122 The standards and regulations which can be enforced through a § 304 citizen suit
include: (1) regulations issued pursuant to 1 110 implementation plans (e.g., emission
limitations, schedules and timetables for compliance); (2) 111 standards of performance
for new stationary sources of pollution; (3) § 112 emission standards for hazardous
pollutants; and (4) § 210 controls or prohibitions respecting motor fuel or fuel additives.
42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(f) (1) (1970).
122 Subject to certain exceptions, the deadlines for the promulgation of the standards
and regulations were as follows: (1) § 110 state implementation plans—May 31, 1972
(if the Administrator disapproved a plan, he should have promulgated a substitute one by
July 31, 1972), 42 U.S.C. 1857c-5(a) to (c) (1970); (2) § Ill standards of perfor-
mance for new stationary sources of pollution—Oct. 31, 1971, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-6(b)(1)
(1970) ; (3) § 112 emission standards for hazardous air pollutants—March 31, 1972, 42
U.S.C. § 1857c-7(b) (1970) ; and (4) § 210 motor fuel controls—no deadline since their
promulgation is a matter of discretion with the Administrator, 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6c(c)
(1970).
124 See 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a) (1970).
125 See note 123 supra.
no 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd mem., 41 U.S.L.W. 2255 (D.C. Cir., Nov. 1,
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the "nondegradation policy" of the Clean Air Act; and the second,
Riverside v. Ruckelshaus, 127
 the duty to promulgate implementation
plans for states which fail to submit plans that qualify for the Admin-
istrator's approval.
A. Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus:
Procedural and Substantive Issues
In Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus,'" the plaintiff environmental group
brought an action under section 304 to enjoin the EPA Administrator
from approving state implementition plans—as he was expected to do
within a short time—which failed to include enforcement procedures
designed to ensure the "nondegradation" of existing air quality. In
other words, the plaintiff contended that it is not sufficient for the im-
plementation plans to be in accord with the national primary and sec-
ondary ambient air quality standards; rather they must also provide
against any further pollution of the air even though that pollution
would not violate the federal minima.' The district court accepted the
plaintiff's interpretation and held that the Administrator was under a
nondiscretionary duty to require state implementation plans to imple-
ment the policy of nondegradation." The Clean Air Act is to be
regarded as setting forth a two-fold mandate: first, air already polluted
in excess of the national standards must be allowed to cleanse itself;
and second, no air, regardless of how pure it may be, may be polluted
to any significant degree.
1. Standing and the Citizen Suit Provision
Before considering the substantive issues, the Sierra Club court
decided, on its own motion, that the plaintiff had standing to bring this
section 304 citizen suit"' within the limitation expressed in the recent
Supreme Court decision of Sierra Club v. Morton.'" It is curious that
the court felt obliged even to consider the issue in light of the broad
authorization given in section 304: "any person may commence a civil
action in his own behalf ...." 133 Congress clearly seems to have granted
standing here without restriction. Concededly, despite the extensive
liberalization that the doctrine of standing has undergone, the doctrine
still usually demands a showing on the part of the plaintiff that he him-
self is adversely affected by the complained-of action.'" Sierra Club v.
1972), cert. granted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3392 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1973) (No. 72-804). See text accom-
panying notes 43-51 supra.
127 4 BNA Env. Rep. Cases 1728 (CD. Cal. 1972).
128 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972).
120 Id. at 254, 256.
180 Id. at 256.
181 Id. at 254.
132 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
138 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
134 The doctrine of standing has been liberalized to the extent that a plaintiff may
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Morton so held.'" This requirement, however, may be modified or
eliminated in certain cases by Congress. It is true that Congress may
not extend the judicial power beyond the constitutional boundaries
implied by the words "case or controversy" in Article III. As the
Supreme Court explained in Sierra Club v. Morton: "Congress may
not confer jurisdiction on Art. III federal courts to render advisory
opinions, . . . or to entertain 'friendly' suits, ... or to resolve 'political
questions,' . . . because suits of this character are inconsistent with the
judicial function under Art. III."' However, the Court continued:
"where a dispute is otherwise justiciable, the question whether the
litigant is a 'proper party to request an adjudication of a particular
issue,' . . . is one within the power of Congress to determine." 1" Con-
gress may, according to this rationale, empower any person to vindicate
the public interest by acting in the capacity of what has been called a
"private Attorney GeneraI." 188
Courts will naturally be loath to relax the traditional standing
requirements absent explicit authorization on the part of Congress.
Nevertheless, the plain and unrestricted wording of section 304 of the
Clean Air Act, corroborated by the legislative history of that section,
reveals that the primary goal of Congress in drafting section 304 was
to protect the public interest by allowing private actions, a policy which
it considered a necessary supplement to administrative action.'" It is
have standing to vindicate non-economic rights. Assodation of Data Processing Service
Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970).
185
 405 U.S. at 738.
126
 Id. at 732 n.3.
187 Id.
188
 While Congress can constitutionally authorize no one, in the absence of an
actual justiciable controversy, to bring a suit for the judidal determination either
of the constitutionality of a statute or the scope of powers conferred by a statute
upon government officers, it can constitutionally authorize one of its own officials,
such as the Attorney General, to bring a proceeding to prevent another official
from acting in violation of his statutory powers; for then an actual controversy
exists, and the Attorney General can properly be vested with authority, in such
a controversy, to vindicate the interest of the public or the government. Instead
of designating the Attorney General, or some other public officer, to bring such
proceedings, Congress can constitutionally enact a statute conferring on any non-
official person, or on a designated group of non-official persons, authority to bring
a suit to prevent action by an officer in violation of his statutory powers; for
then, in like manner, there is an actual controversy, and there is nothing consti-
tutionally prohibiting Congress from empowering any person, official or not, to
institute a proceeding involving such a controversy, even if the sole purpose is to
vindicate the public interest. Such persons, so authorized, are, so to speak, private
Attorney Generals.
Associated Industries of New York State, Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943)
(footnote omitted) (cited with approval in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. at 732 n.3).
180
 The citizen suit provision originated as a Senate amendment to the House bill.
As stated in the Senate Committee Report dealing with the Senate version which, in
substantial part, later became § 304: "Government initiative in seeking enforcement under
the Clear Air Act has been restrained. Authorizing citizens to bring suits for violations of
standards should motivate governmental agencies charged with the responsibility to bring
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submitted that the issue of standing should consequently be considered
superfluous in connection with citizen suits brought under the authority
of the Clean Air Act, and it would be unfortunate if the courts were to
vitiate the effect of section 304 by permitting needless and wasteful
litigation on this issue.
2. The Independence of Section 304 Citizen Suits and Section 307
Judicial Review
Another procedural aspect of the Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus case,
the court's consideration of its jurisdiction under section 304, deserves
mention. The EPA Administrator contended at the hearing that since
section 307 deals specifically with the judicial review provided for his
actions in approving or disapproving state implementation plans, the
plaintiffs should wait until he acts upon those plans and thereupon file
a section 307 suit in the appropriate circuit court, rather than bring a
premature section 304 citizen suit in a district court. The court rejected
this contention on the grounds that the Administrator was exposed to
suit within the precise terms of section 304: he was alleged to have
failed to perform a nondiscretionary duty, i.e., to prevent the degrada-
tion of existing air quality."° The court's treatment of this claim seems
correct since there should be no reason to ignore the literal terms of
section 304 and subordinate that section to section 307. Section 304
allows suit against the Administrator for failure to take action required
by the Act; section 307 allows suit to review actions already taken by
the Administrator. Both sections can logically stand alone, and if Con-
gress had intended that one be dependent on the other, it would have
expressed that intent. Furthermore, no purpose would be served in
waiting for the issues to be ripe for judicial review under section 307
since they present a straightforward question of statutory interpreta-
tion. The issue presented is clear: the EPA Administrator either is or
is not under a nondiscretionary duty to provide for the nondegradation
of existing air quality.
3. The EPA Administrator's Duty to Enforce the Nondegradation
Policy of the Clean Air Act
The holding of Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus—that the Clean Air
Act does not permit degradation of the air despite the achievement of
the national ambient air quality standards—was, it is submitted, a cor-
rect one, but the relief granted appears improper. As the court noted,
the Clean Air Act established a policy against any significant degrada-
tion of the air, and this policy is reflected in the general purpose provi-
sion of the Act, the available legislative history of the Act and of its
1967 predecessor, and prior administrative interpretations of the Act."'
enforcement and abatement proceedings." S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37
(1970). See also 116 Cong. Rec. 32903 (1970) (remarks of Senator Muskie).
140 344 F. Supp. at 254-55.
141 Id. at 255-56. The most important and cogent proof of this policy is given in the
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This policy, however, is not at all related to the approval or disapproval
of state implementation plans according to the language of the Clean
Air Act. The sole purpose of the implementation plans which the states
are expected to adopt and submit to the EPA in accordance with sec-
tion 110 is to provide for the implementation, maintenance, and en-
forcement of the national ambient air quality standards."' Nothing is
said in section 110 regarding the policy of nondegradation. The Admin-
istrator is required by the language of that section to approve all plans
which provide, within certain time limits, for the attainment of the
minimum levels of tolerable pollution as established by the national
standards.148 Again, no mention is made of nondegradation. There is,
then, no express statement in section 110 of the Clean Air Act imposing
a nondiscretionary duty upon the Administrator to refuse approval of
implementation plans that would allow degradation of clean air even
though they would meet national minimum standards—that is, a duty
to implement a policy of nondegradation.
The question immediately arises as to how this policy of non-
degradation, which was so clearly evident in the legislative history of
the Clean Air Act, is to be implemented in the absence of express
authorization. Also, if there is neither any explicit reference to nondeg-
radation nor any provision setting forth administrative procedures for
implementing that policy, another question arises: can it then be
alleged that the Administrator has failed to perform a nondiscretionary
duty and thus be exposed to a section 304 citizen suit?
As related above, the national ambient air quality standards are
merely minimal standards—the primary standard being that which is
requisite to protect the public health and the stricter secondary standard
being that which is requisite to protect the public welfare. 44
 These
standards are not intended, by themselves, to prevent all air pollution of
any significance. There are areas in this country, usually rural areas,
in which the air is significantly purer than is required by the national
standards and which could conceivably be "degraded" to some extent
and still not place the public health or welfare in immediate jeopardy
and thus not violate the federal minima. This possibility has engendered
recent proposals to relocate air polluting industries from urban centers
to the countryside."' In other words, rather than engage in the ex-
language of the Senate Committee Report: "In areas where current air pollution levels are
already equal to, or better than, the air quality goals, [the EPA Administrator] should not
approve any implementation plan which does not provide, to the maximum extent prac-
ticable, for the continued maintenance of such ambient air quality." S. Rep. No. 91-1196,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1970).
142 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(1) (1970).
143 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a) (2) (1970).
144 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-4(b)(1), (2) (1970).
145 Boston Globe, Jan. 16, 1973, at 2, col. 2. Nondegradation was not envisioned as
an absolute policy, but one which depends upon the circumstances of the particular case.
The Senate Report states:
Once [the air quality] goals are established, deterioration of air quality should not
be permitted except under circumstances where there is no available alternative.
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pensive and often risky venture of developing air pollution control tech-
niques, industry could procrastinate by spreading out the air pollution
it produces. The Sierra Club court recognized that such relocation for
the purpose of avoiding the expense of compliance with the nondegra-
dation policy of the Act does not accord with the spirit of the Act, and
it has effectively forbidden it by requiring the EPA to approve only
those state implementation plans which guard against degradation.
Nonetheless, the procedures in section 110 for the formulation of im-
plementation plans do not apply to the policy of nondegradation.
Hence it appears that the Clean Air Act suffers from a serious
shortcoming: it endorses a nondegradation policy without explicitly
providing for administrative procedures for the implementation of that
policy. If nondegradation is to be regarded as simply a matter of discre-
tion with the Administrator, it is doubtful that it will ever be pursued
with the vigor and purpose with which Congress endorsed it. Indeed,
the present Administrator and the EPA have strenuously opposed any
responsibility on their part for its implementation and have presented
the courts with the unusual situation of an administrative agency at-
tempting to circumscribe its own authority.'"
It is suggested, however, that there is a provision in the Clean Air
Act which may be logically invoked to enforce the nondegradation pol-
icy. Section 111 requires the Administrator to promulgate regulations
establishing federal standards of performance for new sources of po-
tential air pollution."' "New source" is defined very broadly as "any
stationary source, the construction or modification of which is com-
menced after the publication of regulations." 148 "Modification" means
"any physical change in, or change in the method of operation of, a
stationary source which increases the amount of any air pollutant
emitted by such source or which results in the emission of any air pol-
lutant not previously emitted." 149 Therefore, almost all activities which
could give rise to the degradation of existing air quality would come
within the scope of these definitions. The construction of new air pol-
luting industries or their relocation would certainly be included, as
would almost all changes in operation. The language of section 111 is
phrased in terms of reasonableness and feasibility.'
Given the various alternative means of preventing and controlling air pollution—
including the use of the best available control technology, industrial processes, and
operating practices—and care in the selection of sites for new sources, land use
planning and traffic controls—deterioration need not occur.
S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1970).
146 Boston Globe, Jan. 16, 1973, at 2, col. 2.
	147 42 U.S.C.	 1857c-6(b) (1970).
	 8 42 U.S.C.	 1857c-6(a)(2) (1970).
	149
 42 U.S.C.	 1857c-6(a)(4) (1970).
199
 "The term 'standard of performance' means a standard for emissions of air
pollutants which reflects the degree of emission limitation achievable through the applica-
tion of the best system of emission reduction which (taking into account the cost of
achieving such reduction) the Administrator determines has been adequately demon-
strated." 42 U.S.C. 1857c-6(a) (1) (1970).
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If section 111 is interpreted as the section of the Act which Con-
gress intended to express the nondegradation policy, that policy must
be regarded as a flexible one. On the other hand, if section 111 is not the
applicable provision and the policy of nondegradation is portrayed as
an absolute one, there is an inherent contradiction in the Clean Air Act.
The position that the comparatively pure air of some regions of this
country may not be degraded to any significant extent is irreconcilable
with the fact that Congress authorized the EPA Administrator to per-
mit the construction or, modification of air-polluting industries as long
as the best pollution control devices which are available and econom-
ically feasible are used. The only rational solution to this perplexing
problem is to conceive of the policy of nondegradation as a reasonable
one to be implemented by section 111: This conclusion should not be
interpreted as giving industry carte blanche to relocate and avoid
serious efforts to develop an efficient technology for dealing with air
pollution. The regulations issued pursUant to section 111 may be de-
manding as well as reasonable."'
Through the combined use of sections 110 and 111, the Ad-
ministrator would thus be able to fulfill the double mandate of the
Clean Air Act by formulating two diffent sets of standards: first,
the national ambient air quality standards, the enforcement of which
will allow the passage of time to cleanse ,the air which is already polluted
to such an extent that it endangers the ; public health and welfare; and
second, the standards of performance for new stationary sources, the
enforcement of which will forbid the degradation of air which is not
yet polluted and prevent the polluting industries from evading their
present duty so solve the air pollution: problem. This approach seems
to be the only practical answer to the question of how to abate existing
air pollution while avoiding future pollution. If nondegradation is
dealt with simply as an implied requirement of section 110 imple-
mentation plans, confusion will, necessarily result due to the lack
of standards, of procedures, and of time limitations.
It is arguable, therefore, that the Administrator can substantially
implement the policy of nondedradation by fulfilling his nondiscre-
tionary duty under section 111 to promulgate standards of performance
for new stationary sources. Had the plaintiffs in Sierra Club alleged
a failure of this duty as a basis of their section 304 action, the court
could have reached its result on more solid ground. It should be re-
marked that section 111 is not as forthright as section 110. Section 111
provides that the states "may," not "shall," develop and submit
procedures for the implementation of the federal guidelines.'" The
section further provides: "If the Administrator finds the State pro-
cedure is adequate, he shall delegate to such State any authority he
151 The Administrator has already promulgated standards of performance for certain
industrial activities. See 40 C.F.R. Pt. 60 (1972). It is beyond the scope of this comment to
determine whether those standards could adequately implement the nondegradation policy.
152 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-6(c) (1) (1970).
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has under this chapter to implement and enforce such standards ....in"
Here the stress is not so much upon required state participation as it
is upon the development of implementation plans for the national
ambient air quality standards. The states are not required to submit
effective implementation procedures, nor is the Administrator bound
to promulgate state-wide procedures if the states fail to do so as he
would be under section 110. The Administrator, however, is under a
definite duty under section 111 to prevent the needless pollution of
already pure air by increased industrial activity, and it is this duty
which should have been enforced in the Sierra Club suit. The question
then arises whether a nondiscretionary duty was involved in this case.
Since the Administrator has promulgated standards of performance,'"
he can be said to have fulfilled the nondiscretionary duty imposed upon
him by section 111. If the plaintiffs should contest the position that
these standards are an adequate implementation of the nondegradation
policy, they would be challenging the Administrator's judgment and
discretion. It would therefore seem that the proper means of seeking
judicial review of the Administrator's action would have been a
section 307 suit if section 111 had been recognized by the court as
the means by which Congress expressed the nondegradation policy.
B. Riverside v. Ruckelshaus: The Los Angeles Air Pollution
Problem and Some Procedural Considerations
1. The .Duty to Promulgate Substitute Implementation Plans
Another duty which section 110 imposes upon the Administrator is
the requirement that he propose and promulgate regulations setting
forth an implementation plan for any state which fails to submit an
acceptable plan within the prescribed time limits."' It was for a
failure to perform this nondiscretionary duty that the Administrator
was sued by the cities of Riverside and San Bernardino, California,
among others, in Riverside v. Ruckelshaus."' The Administrator had,
on May 31, 1972, disapproved large portions of the implementation
plan submitted by California, especially those parts which set forth
procedures for implementing the primary ambient air quality standards
for nitrogen oxides, particulates, and photochemical oxidants in the
South Coast Air Basin, i.e., the metropolitan Los Angeles area.'
According to the timetable set forth in section 110, the Administrator
should have promulgated a substitute plan for these portions by July
31, 1972.' By the time that the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary
153 Id.
154 See note 151 supra.
155 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(c) (1970).
156 4 BNA Env. Rep. Cases 1728 (CD. CaI. 1972).
157 37 Fed. Reg. 10851-55 (1972).
las If the strict deadlines in § 110 were met, the implementation plan process would
have run in the following fashion: (1) publication of proposed national ambient air
Quality standards—January 31, 1971; (2) promulgation of those standards—April 30,
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injunction was heard, the Administrator had proposed or promulgated
regulations curing most of the defects in the California plan except
the lack of acceptable transportation controls for the attainment of
the national standards for photochemical oxidants.'"
"Transportation controls" are "measures which would reduce in-
dividual vehicle emissions and/or vehicle miles traveled."'" Individual
vehicle emissions could be reduced through the use of pollution con-
trol devices fitted to individual cars and other vehicles or through the
use of other types of engines which would not emit the amount of
pollution presently being emitted by the piston engine. Vehicle miles
traveled could be reduced through various programs designed to dis-
courage the use of cars and other vehicles with the substitution of mass
transit. Such measures are required by section 110 only if necessary
for the implementation plan of a state to satisfy the national ambient
air .quality standards. 1°1 In most areas of the country, the national
standards could be met through the use of emission controls on
stationary sources of air pollution alone.'" However, there are some
areas of the country—including the Los Angeles area—where auto-
mobiles and other vehicular traffic are responsible for most of the air
pollution and where the federal emission standards for new cars would
not be sufficient to abate the pollution due to photochemical oxidants. 16"
The states involved (or the Administrator should they fail to respond)
are required by section 110 to include in their implementation plans
measures to reduce the pollution generated by used cars in those
areas.'"
The court in Riverside held that the Administrator had un-
justifiably breached a nondiscretionary duty according to the literal
terms of the Act, and it accordingly ordered the Administrator to
publish, no later than January 15, 1973, proposed regulations setting
forth an implementation plan for attaining the primary ambient air
quality standard for photochemical oxidants in California, including
all necessary transportation controls.'" The Administrator later corn-
1971; (3) submission by the states of implementation plans—January 31, 1972; (4)
approval or disapproval by the Administrator of those plans--May 31, 1972; (5) promul-
gation of implementation plans by the Administrator, if necessary, to replace disapproved
plans—July 31, 1972. See 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4,5 (1970).
160 37 Fed. Reg. 19812-15, 19830-35 (1972). The Administrator stated that he would
not promulgate such transportation controls until February 15, 1973 (almost six months
beyond the statutory deadline). 37 Fed. Reg. 19829 (1972),
180 38 Fed. Reg. 2194 (1973).
161 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a) (2)(B) (1970).
102 38 Fed. Reg. 2194 (1973).
168 Id.
1°4 Id.
103 4 BNA Env. Rep. Cases at 1731. The same issue, the unwarranted extension of
time for the submission of transportation controls, was raised in Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. EPA, 4 BNA Env. Rep. Cases 1945 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The extension was
challenged as granted to all the states. Suits had previously been filed in all the circuit
courts but were consolidated and heard by the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit. That court held that it had Jurisdiction under 1 307(b)(1) of the
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plied with this order and in an accompanying statement explained
why he had felt it to be necessary to allow a one-year extension beyond
the statutory deadline for the consideration of transportation controls:
"Unlike the situation with respect to stationary sources, however,
neither EPA nor the States had any real experience with ;hese types
of controls. The nature of the controls required, their effectiveness,
their effect on air quality, and their social and economic impacts were
essentially unknown."'"
The court's decision was nonetheless a necessary one since sec-
tion 110 imposes on the Administrator an absolute deadline within
which he must promulgate plans for the implementation of primary
ambient air quality standards to replace disapproved state plans.167
In pointed contrast, section 110 allows the Administrator the discre-
tion to grant an eighteen-month extension to any state for the sub-
mission of its plan for the implementation of secondary ambient air
quality standards. 1" Congress evidently intended that the primary
standards, which are designed to protect the public health, be quickly
established as a matter of first priority. The definite time limits which
were included in the present Act are a deliberate response on the part
of Congress to the time-consuming delays which were encountered
under the insufficient administrative procedures of the Clean Air Act
of 1967.100
It is understandable why the Administrator was pressed to allow
the extension in this case. The notorious air pollution problem in the
area surrounding Los Angeles is due mainly to the unique physical
aspects of the South Coast Air Basin."° The region is geographically
and meteorologically enclosed."' The encircling mountains and the
frequent inversions prevent the natural dispersion of pollutants, and
the Southern California climate provides ample sunshine to aid in
the formation of photochemical smog."2
 Since most of the hydrocarbon
emissions in the area are attributable to the use of motor vehicles,
transportation controls are the only apparent answer.' The problem,
Clean Air Act since the D.C. Circuit was the "appropriate circuit" for the review of
decisions of the Administrator which were nationwide. The court thereupon issued an
order which, among other things, compelled the Administrator to rescind the extension
of time. Id. at 1945-47.
1" 38 Fed. Reg. 2194 (1973).
167 42 U.S.C. I 1857c-5(c) (1970).
168 42 U.S.C. 6 1857c-5(b) (1970).
160
 Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See Com-
ment, The Clean Air Amendments of 1970: Better Automotive Ideas from Congress, 12
B.C. Ind. & Com, L. Rev. 571, 576 (1971).
170 38 Fed. Reg. 2194 (1973).
171 Id.
172 Id. Nitrogen dioxide and hydrocarbons (both of which are emitted principally by
automobiles and other vehicles) combine in the presence of sunlight to form ozone, which
recombines with nitrogen dioxide to create chemicals usually labeled photochemical smog.
One common chemical which forms is peroxyacetyl nitrate (PAN), others are aldehydes
including formaldehydes. A. Reitze, Environmental Law ch. 3, at 10 (2d ed. 1972).
178 38 Fed. Reg. 2194 (1973).
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however, becomes almost insoluble when it is considered that the auto-
mobile is by necessity the dominant mode of transportation due to
the low-density, sprawling pattern of development which characterizes
Southern California.'" The Administrator has expressed very serious
reservations about the viability of the regulations which he was ordered
to propose.' The most controversial of the regulations deal, of course,
with the transportation controls. These controls fall into two categories:
first, the reduction of emissions from individual vehicles through the
use of retrofit devices to be required of all used cars by January 1,
1976; 176 and second, the reduction by eighty percent of the vehicle
miles traveled through the use of a gas rationing system to commence
in 1975.1"
As the Administrator has explained, the impact of this transporta-
tion control plan will be profound.'" First, the vehicle owners them-
selves may have to assume the rather high cost of the retrofit devices.'
Second, the reduction in the mobility of workers and consumers could
seriously disrupt the economy of the Los Angeles area and considerably
diminish local, state, and Federal tax revenues 180 And third, the com-
pulsory reduction of the amount of driving done by the people of the
region would radically change their style of living.'" The obvious
measure needed to ameliorate the drastic effects of an eighty percent
reduction in automobile use is the development of mass transit. But
the very reason for the region's heavy reliance upon automobiles and
other motor vehicles—its low-density, sprawling pattern of develop-
ment—is not conducive to the effective use of mass transit."'
In spite of the obvious difficulties (perhaps insurmountable in
terms of the statutory deadlines), the legal requirements of the Clean
Air Act dictated the result in Riverside v. Ruckelshaus. If more time
is necessary for the states to achieve effective, and reasonable, imple-
mentation of the national ambient air quality standards, the correct
course to follow would be to seek congressional approval of any needed
postponement.
174 Id.
175 38 Fed. Reg. 2195 (1973) ; Boston Globe, Jan. 16, 1973, at 2, cols. 2-3.
170 38 Fed. Reg. 2198 (1973) (proposed 40 C.F.R. § 52.229(b)), In the case of fleets
of vehicles comprised of ten or more vehicles, such vehicles will have to be converted to
gaseous fuel. Id. (proposed 40 C.F.R. § 52.229(c)).
177 38 Fed. Reg. 2195, 2199 (1973) (proposed 40 C.F.R. § 52.229(f) ). Gas rationing
would be in effect only during the peak pollution period from May 1 to October 31. Id.
178 38 Fed. Reg. 2196-97 (1973).
no Id. "The cost of control devices could range from $200 to $400. The annual cost
of inspection/maintenance and the increased cost of gasoline caused by marketing controls
is [sic] estimated to be $5 to $13. . . . Fleet vehicles could convert to gaseous fuel at a
cost of $500 to $800 per vehicle." Id. at 2197.
180 Id. at 2196-97.
181 Id. at 2197.
182 Id. at 2198.
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-2: The Notice Requirement and the Award of Attorney Fees
There are, in addition, two procedural issues raised in the River-
side case which, though of comparatively less importance than the
principal issue, warrant discussion in relation to the use and interpre-
tation of the Clean Air Act by the courts. The first concerns the notice
requirement for citizen suits brought under section 304. A citizen who
seeks to compel the Administrator to perform a nondiscretionary duty
under the Act must give the Administrator notice, in such manner as
the Administrator has prescribed by regulation,' sixty days prior to
the commencement of the action.'" Since an action is commenced with
the filing of the complaint, 18" section 304 therefore requires two
months' notice before legal action can even be instituted. The plain-
tiffs in Riverside failed to give the Administrator any such notice.
Nonetheless, the court rather generously concluded that there had
been "substantial compliance and actual constructive compliance," in
that (1) the personal service of the complaint on the Administrator
was actual notice of the plaintiff's demand; (2) sixty days had elapsed
between the filing of the complaint and the hearing in court; and, (3)
the Administrator had during that period all the beneficial effect of
the statutory provision, so the purposes of the provision were ful-
filled.'" The intent of Congress in requiring notice was to afford the
EPA sufficient time to act and remove the cause for complaint,'" and
this intent is not frustrated provided that the interval between the
filing of a section 304 complaint and the court's hearing on it is at
least as long as sixty days.
The other procedural aspect of the case involved the court's re-
fusal to award attorney fees.'" The explanation for such a decision
was simply that the action was one against the federal government.'
The provision in section 304 that specifically allows for the award of
attorney fees is phrased in discretionary language,'" but the legisla-
tive history of this provision reveals a very strong expression of policy
on the part of Congress: "The Courts should recognize that in bring-
ing legitimate actions under this section citizens would be performing
a public service and in such instances the courts should award costs
of litigation to such party."'" Perhaps the court determined that such 
183 See 40 C.F.R. § 54 (1972).
184 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(b) (2) (1970). In the case of a suit against an alleged violator
of an emission standard or limitation promulgated pursuant to the Act or of an order
issued by the Administrator or a state with respect to such a standard or limitation, the
plaintiff must give sixty days' notice to the Administrator and the interested state as well
as to the defendant. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(b)(1) (1970).
188
 Fed. R. Civ. P. 3.
188
 4 BNA Env. Rep. Cases at 1731.
187
 See S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1970).
188 4 BNA Env. Rep. Cases at 1731.
188 Id.
180 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(d) (1970), reprinted in note 24 supra.
181 S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1970). The Senate Committee felt
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an award in Riverside would not have been appropriate for some rea-
son other than the fact that the suit was brought against the Govern-
ment, but that fact in itself is not a legitimate reason under the Act,
since section 304 authorizes suits against the Government, and attor-
ney fees as well. A court should, it is submitted, either award the fees
or, if such an award is inappropriate, explain why it is so, but an ap-
parently arbitrary decision which denies the award of attorney fees
will effectively frustrate the congressional policy behind section 304.
This is true since no party but the most altruistic would hazard the
costs of litigation to obtain injunctive relief under the Act when it
does not anticipate reasonable reimbursement.
There should be no great anxiety that liberal awards would en-
courage harassing suits. Congress foresaw this danger and minimized
it by providing that attorney fees could be awarded to either party.'
Thus if the court decides that a citizen suit has been brought in bad
faith or without any reasonable cause, the court should not hesitate
to award the Government its costs of litigation. The proper course for
the courts to follow is to overcome their traditional disinclination to
award costs of litigation and to give full effect to the congressional
purpose in section 304. A two-fold benefit will then accrue: the award
of fees, where appropriate, to plaintiffs will encourage public partici-
pation in the administrative process, and the award of fees, where
appropriate, to defendants will discourage the bringing of unreason-
able actions.
III. COMMON LAW REMEDIES AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES
TO THE REMEDIAL PROVISIONS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT
While the preceding section has dealt with the right of citizens to
seek injunctive relief under the citizen suit provision for the enforce-
ment of the Clean Air Act, this section will be concerned with other
theories of relief which those adversely affected by air pollution may
employ. These remedies are still available to the public notwithstanding
the broad reach of the citizen suit provision: section 304 itself is quite
explicit about the fact that it is not intended to restrict any other rights
which plaintiffs may claim under other statutes or the common law.'
In seeking relief from the effects of air pollution, plaintiffs have ad-
vanced a variety of theories, ranging from the ingenious to the tradi-
tional, claiming rights arising under the National Environmental
that this policy should extend even to plaintiffs in actions which result in successful abate-
ment but do not reach a verdict. Id. See also 116 Cong. Rec. 32903 (1970).
102 42 U.S.C. * 1857h-2(d) (1970).
198 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(e) (1970), set out in note 24 supra. Furthermore, "Iclom-
pliance with standards under [the Clean Air] Act would not be a defense to a common
law action for pollution damages." S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1970).
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Policy Act,'" the Constitution,'" the "federal common law," 1" the fed-
eral antitrust statutes,197 and the common law as it has developed
among the states.198
 •
The claims attempting to infer rights from the general purpose pro-
visions of the NEPA and from constitutional language have been re-
jected as frivolous. 1" The simple explanation for this lack of success
lies in the fact that the suits involved were brought against private
individuals who owed no duties to the plaintiffs under either NEPA or
the Constitution. NEPA is basically an "environmental full disclosure
law" applicable only to the agencies and instrumentalities of the federal
government.200 The case against rights implied by constitutional pro-
visions is even stronger. One cannot reasonably lay claim to a right
to clean air and a safe and healthy environment as existing within the
"penumbra" of the Constitution when the defendants against whom
this right is asserted are purely private individuals."' Courts have not
vindicated constitutional rights absent a showing of governmental . in-
trusion into the privacy of citizens 202 At any rate, any attempts by the
courts to recognize such imputed rights and fashion remedies for such
rights would clearly constitute a usurpation of legislative power. A com-
plex area such as the control of pollution demands not only a great deal
of special expertise but also an intricate balancing process whereby
economic, social, and political factors must be weighed. Functions such
as these should properly be exercised by the legislatures on both the
state and the federal levels.
This section will discuss air pollution law as affected by the federal
common law and the federal antitrust statutes. Neither of these theories
has been litigated to a final judgment, but both present possibilities for
for the use of the federal judiciary to award compensatory as well as
injunctive relief. The Clean Air Act is, of course, a primarily regulatory
104 See, e.g., Tanner v. Armco Steel Co., 340 F. Supp. 532 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
199 See, e.g., Heart Disease Research Foundation v. General Motors Corp., 463 F.2d
98 (2d Cir. 1972).
196 See, e.g., Washington v. General Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109 (1972).
197 See, e.g., In re Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equipment, 52 F.R.D. 398
(CD. Cal. 1970).
195 See, e.g., Chicago v. General Motors Corp., 467 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1972). State
common Iaw is usually invoked under the private nuisance heading. A discussion of this
area is beyond the scope of this article, which is limited to developments in air pollution
law on the federal level.
109 See Heart Disease Research Foundation v. General Motors Corp., 463 F.2d 98,
100 (2d Cir. 1972); Tanner v. Armco Steel Corp., 340 F. Supp. 532, 534-37 (S.D. Tex.
1972); In re Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equipment, 52 F.R.D. 398, 402 (C.D.
Cal. 1970).
200 Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 728 (ED.
Ark. 1971). Even where a government instrumentality is the defendant in a suit, a private
plaintiff is limited to enforcing the procedural requirements of the NEPA and can claim
no substantive rights under the Act. Id. at 755. For a contrary view, see E. Hanks & J.
Hanks, An Environmental Bill of Rights: The Citizen Suit and The National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969, 24 Rutgers L. Rev. 230, 244-51 (1970).
201 52 F.R.D. at 402.
202 Id.
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statute by which standards for various types of pollution are formulated
and enforced. The Act does not provide for the recovery of damages or
property. Thus, unless plaintiffs wish to present their claims for com-
pensation in state courts by taking the difficult route of private nui-
sance,'" they will have to succeed in convincing the federal courts
that there exists a basis for federal jurisdiction over their actions for
damages.
A. "The Federal Common Law" Governing Air Pollution
The possibility of resorting to "federal common law" to deal with
air pollution as a nuisance was raised by the Supreme Court in the
recent case of Washington v. General Motors Corp!" Eighteen states,
with sixteen others and the City of New York filing a brief as amid
curiae,'" sought to invoke the Court's original jurisdiction under Ar-
ticle III, section 2 of the Constitution.'" They petitioned for leave to
file a complaint against all four of the major U.S. automobile manu-
facturers and the latter's trade association. It was alleged that the
defendants had since 1953 engaged in a conspiracy to restrain the de-
velopment of motor vehicle air pollution control equipment and that
such conspiracy had substantially contributed to the present air pollu-
tion crisis. The proposed complaint originally contained three counts,
one of which charged that the defendants' actions constituted a public
nuisance contrary to the public policy of the plaintiff states and the
federal government. For some reason, all the plaintiffs but one filed a
memorandum striking this count from the complaint. The Court denied
leave to file the complaint on discretionary grounds and remitted the
parties to the appropriate district court for the resolution of all three
counts.'" Justice Douglas, speaking for a unanimous Court, noted
specifically that the plaintiffs might renew the public nuisance count in
the district court according to the rationale of Illinois v. City of Mil-
248 An interesting alternative to the use of private nuisance was presented by the
plaintiff in Chicago v. General Motors Corp., 467 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1972), a diversity
case in which a strict product liability claim was made under Illinois law. The city of
Chicago alleged that the defendant automobile manufacturers were responsible for a sub-
stantial amount of the air pollution generated in that city because of the defendants' con-
duct in manufacturing and selling motor vehicles without pollution control devices. The
circuit court dismissed the complaint because it failed to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted in view of the present state Ihw. Id. at 1267.
204 406 U.S. 109 (1972).
208 Id. at 113 n.3.
200 "In all Cases ... in which a State shall be a Party, the suprenie Court shall have
original Jurisdiction." U.S. Coast. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. Such jurisdiction is exclusive only
where the controversy is between two or more states. 28 U.S.C. 1251(a)(1) (1970). In
cases where only one party is a state, the Court's jurisdiction may be shared with the
inferior federal courts, and its exercise is therefore discretionary. 406 U.S. at 113-14. See
also Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 44)6 U.S. 91, 93-98 (1972).
247 406 U.S. at 116.
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waukee,208 a water pollution case which was decided by the Court the
same day."'
The plaintiffs in the Illinois case, like those in the Washington
case, were states. They invoked the original jurisdiction of the Court,
but were also denied leave to file their proposed complaint and were
remitted to the district courts?" In this second case, the State of
Illinois was seeking to enjoin the City of Milwaukee from dumping
improperly treated sewage into Lake Michigan, a body of interstate
water. Before deciding to remit Illinois to the proper district court,
the Court determined whether the district court would have juris-
diction to hear the case."' The "federal question" statute places a
double limitation on the original jurisdiction of the federal district
courts: first, the matter in controversy must exceed the sum of $10,000;
and second, it must arise under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States." 212 A unanimous Court held that the jurisdictional
amount was no obstacle in light of the extensive harm threatened by
the defendant's alleged actions, and that the controversy did arise
under the laws of the United States."' Justice Douglas, again speak-
ing for the Court, reasoned that while Congress had enacted numer-
ous statutes governing interstate waters, those laws did not authorize
the remedy sought by Illinois. However, the fact that Congress had
expressed interest in this area by its enactment of those other statutes
was held to signify that "it is federal law, not state law, that in the
end controls the pollution of interstate or navigable waters." 2" In
other words, despite the inapplicability of the federal statutes to the
situation before the Court, their existence suggested that federal rights
are involved in this area; and federal courts will not refuse to fashion
a federal common law to protect federal rights."' This result, the
Court explained, is in line with the federal question jurisdictional
statute: the "laws" under which a controversy must arise, for a fed-
eral district court to assume jurisdiction to settle it, include not only
statutes but also the federal common law. 2"
- The Court then advanced the broad proposition: "When we deal
with air or water in their ambient or interstate aspects, there is a
federal common law .-. . ."217 It should be noted that the particular
factual situation in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee did involve a state
bringing a public nuisance action against the political subdivision of
another. Even if the Court's holding is to be limited to such a situa-
208 Id. at 91.
200 Id. at 112 n.2.
210 Id. at 108.
211 Id. at 98-101.
212 28 U.S.C.	 1331(a) (1970).
218 406 U.S. at 98-99.
214 Id. at 102.
215 Id. at 103 (citing Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957)).
216 406 U.S. at 100.
217 Id. at 103.
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tion, it will certainly have far-reaching effects. However, should this
decision be extended, as arguably it could be extended, to situations
involving an individual bringing a private nuisance action against an-
other," the federal court system would be made accessible to litigants
for the hearing of damage claims under the federal common law as
well as for the hearing, which is presently available, of claims for
injunctive relief under section 304 of the Clean Air Act. Theoreti-
cally, then, anyone who suffers damage in the amount of $10,000
or more from the effects of interstate pollution may be permitted to
bring a claim for damages in the federal district courts under the
federal question jurisdictional statute.
But even should this potential right to invoke federal jurisdic-
tion for compensatory relief from damage caused by interstate air
pollution be recognized, there may exist a very real obstacle to its
full exercise: the problem of how to define "interstate" air pollution.
In the case of water pollution, it is relatively easy to disting-uish
bodies of interstate water from bodies of intrastate water. As far as
air pollution is concerned, such a distinction is difficult, if not impos-
sible, to draw. Indeed, the Clean Air Act is based on the premise
that there is no effective distinction between interstate and intrastate
air for the purposes of the Act.
Although the Act affirms that the prevention of air pollution is
primarily the responsibility of the states and local governments, a
realistic examination of the Act reveals that the federal government
is given the ultimate responsibility over the entire area. It is the
federal government, through the Administrator of the EPA, that
promulgates the national ambient air quality standards.' The states
are then required to develop implementation plans in accordance with
the standards for the areas designated by the Administrator. 2" Fur-
thermore, these plans must be approved by the Administrator before
they become operative."' Should the Administrator disapprove a par-
ticular state implementation plan, he promulgates a substitute one for
the state involved. 222 And, most significantly, the Administrator may
issue an order or bring enforcement proceedings against anyone who
is in violation of the requirements of an implementation plan 2 28
Therefore, although the implementation plans approved or formulated
by the Administrator may vary from state to state, the standards of
air quality are national. Absolutely no distinction is made between
interstate and intrastate air: the Clean Air Act is concerned with
the "ambient air," which the EPA has broadly defined as "that por-
218 There has, as yet, been no scholarly commentary on this theoretical extension
of the holding in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee.
219 42 U.S.C. I 1857c-4 (1970).
220 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(1) (1970).
221 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(cl) (1970).
222 42 U.S.C. 4 1857c-5(c) (1970).
22a 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8 (1970).
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Lion of the atmosphere, external to buildings, to which the general
public has access." 2"
One might ask whether the inference then arises that a private
suit for damages under the federal common law of air pollution may
be brought in a federal court without a particularized showing that
the complained-of pollution had actually crossed state boundaries. Al-
though the scope of this article precludes a detailed discussion of the
exact extent to which Illinois v. City of Milwaukee applies to private
individuals, it is submitted that plaintiffs seeking federal relief on
grounds of private nuisance would have to show that their damages
were caused by interstate pollution. It may be true that in order to
protect the national interest in interstate commerce, Congress may
authorize private citizens to seek injunctive relief in federal courts
to abate air pollution which originates within the boundaries of a
state, but which is a potential threat to the quality of air beyond the
boundaries. But a person who complains of damage inflicted by a
local pollutor is claiming no federal right; he should properly resort
to a state forum for relief from this individual injury. Of course, if
any substantial injury has been inflicted, there is a probability that
the pollutor responsible violated a requirement of the applicable state
implementation plan. In that event, the complainant is authorized to
seek injunctive relief in the federal courts under section 304 of the
Clean Air Act, but that authorization extends only to a vindication
of federal rights, viz., the enforcement of the national ambient air
quality standards for the preservation of the air as a national resource.
If and when an action for damages due to the effects of air pollution
is brought in a federal court and is grounded in a theory of federal
common law, the plaintiff ought to show first, that the damages are in
the amount of $10,000 or more; 225 and second, that the complained-of
pollution originated in a state other than the plaintiff's.
Concerning the content of this new federal common law of pol-
lution, Justice Douglas noted in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee that
"[w]hile the various federal environmental protection statutes will not
necessarily mark the outer bounds of the federal common law, they
224 40 C.F.R. § 50.1(e) (1972).
225 The Supreme Court noted in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee that "the con-
siderable interests involved in the purity of interstate waters would seem to put beyond
question the jurisdictional amount . . . ." 406 U.S. 91, 98 (1972). Furthermore, it may
be contended that "the right to live in an environment free from [air pollution] and .. .
the right of the defendant to operate its . . . facility are both in excess of $10,000.00."
Biechele v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 309 F. Supp. 354, 355 (N.D. Ohio 1969).
There is also the possibility, not yet raised, of a plaintiff avoiding the $10,000
limitation by bringing his request for damages as a pendent claim in a suit for injunc-
tive relief under § 304 since Congress has dispensed with the limitation for § 304
suits. It could be argued that both claims should be heard together since they share
a "common nucleus of operative fact." United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs,
383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). Gibbs could also support bringing a state claim for damages
pendent to the federal claim for injunctive relief under § 304.
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may provide useful guidelines in fashioning such rules of decision." 228
If the courts follow this reasoning and adopt the standards and state-
ments of policy expressed in the Clean Air Act, plaintiffs seeking
monetary relief for damage caused by air pollution may fare better
with the new federal common law than they would with state nui-
sance law. According to the traditional common law of nuisance,
not all interferences with another's protected interests are ac-
tionable.227 The interference must be unreasonable.228 The proper
standard for determining whether a defendant's conduct is unreasonable
is the "interest balancing test." 22° As Dean Prosser has explained:
The defendant's privilege of making a reasonable use of his
own property for his own benefit and conducting his affairs
in his own way is no less important. than the plaintiff's right
to use and enjoy his premises. The two are correlative and
interdependent, and neither is entitled to prevail entirely, at
the expense of the other. Some balance must be struck between
the two.28°
However, if the plaintiff convinces a federal court (or a state court
treating the case as one arising under federal law) that the standards
of the Clean Air Act should be adopted as minimal standards of rea-
sonableness, and if he can further show that the defendant has vio-
lated those standards during the period in which the harm was inflicted,
the plaintiff can greatly simplify his case and avoid the interest bal-
ancing test. The defendant may not be able to defend his conduct
as reasonable if it is in violation of federally approved air quality
standards. Thus, the very specific regulations promulgated pursuant
to the Clean Air Act could become a clear and definite way for the
court to determine whether the 'defendant's actions should be ad-
judged wrong in themselves. The plaintiff would then be left to prove
only the remaining elements of causation and extent of damages.
B. The Antitrust Suits Brought against the
Automobile Industry
Another tactic utilized by the plaintiffs in Washington v. General
Motors Corp.,281 and by plaintiffs in other cases, 232 has been to charge
violations of the federal antitrust laws.'" More specifically, the corn-
220 406 U.S. at 103 n.5.
227 W. Prosser, The Law of Torts 580-82, 596-602 (4th ed. 1971).
228 Id. at 596-602.
228 Id. at 596.
280 Id.
281 The plaintiffs also charged a common law conspiracy in restraint of trade
independent of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, 406 U.S. at 111-12.
282 In re Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equipment, 52 F.R.D. 398, 400
(C.D. Cal. 1970); Heart Disease Research Foundation v. General Motors Corp., 463
F.2d 98, 99 (2d Cir. 1972).
288 Section l'of the Sherman Act, as amended, provides in pertinent part: "Every
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plaints have been based on the allegation that the defendants, mem-
bers of the automobile industry and its organizations, have been
engaged in a conspiracy, beginning as early as 1953 but concealed
until January of 1969, to restrain the development of motor vehicle
air pollution control equipment. Impetus for this novel theory was .
apparently given by a consent decree obtained by the federal govern-
ment as a result of a criminal antitrust action brought against mem-
bers of the industry. In that case, United States v. Automobile Manu-
facturers Ass'n, Inc.,'" the Government had charged that the "Big
Four"—General Motors Corporation, Ford Motor Company, Chrysler
Corporation, and American Motors Corporation—had, along with
their trade association, "conspired with other motor vehicle man-
ufacturers, in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1),
to eliminate competition in the research, development, manufacture
and installation of motor vehicle air pollution control equipment, and
in the purchase from others of patents and patent rights, covering
such equipment." 2" The court approved the consent decree "prohib-
iting the defendants, inter alia, from combining or conspiring to pre-
vent, restrain or limit the development, manufacture, installation,
distribution or sale of air pollution control equipment and requiring
the defendants to make available to all applicants on a royalty free
basis, licenses on air pollution control patents.'"
Certain individual parties, including states, counties, cities, gov-
ernmental agencies, groups, and private citizens, petitioned to inter-
vene in this case, but their petitions were denied.237 The purpose of
their intervention was, as the court saw it,2" to block the consent
decree, compel the parties to litigate the case to judgment on the
merits, and thus use the judgment as a basis for treble damage claims
under the Clayton Act. 2" Several of the parties, along with others,
subsequently brought actions based on the same factual claims in
different district courts across the country.24° The Judicial Panel on
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States . . . is declared to be illegal .. . ." 26
Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). Section 4 of the Clayton Act,
as amended, provides in pertinent part: "Any person who shall be injured in his busi-
ness or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue . . .
and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including
a reasonable attorney's fee." 38 Stat. 731 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
284 307 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
255 Id. at 618.
288 In re Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equipment, 311 F. Supp. at 1349-50
n.2 (J.P.M.L. 1970).
237 307 F. Supp. at 619-20.
288 Id.
255 This course of action was pursued by the plaintiffs since § 5 of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1970), allows a final judgment, but not a consent decree, ob-
tained by the federal government to be regarded as prima facie evidence against the
defendant in a suit brought by an individual for treble damages due to the adjudged
conspiracy. 307 F. Supp. at 619-20.
240 311 F. Supp. at 1349-50. The plaintiffs who were denied leave to intervene in
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Multidistrict Litigation has transferred all the cases to the District
Court for the Central District of California for coordinated pretrial
proceedings, and such proceedings are currently underway. 241 There
has yet been no discussion by the courts of this claim on the merits.
CONCLUSION
Of the judicial decisions which have dealt with the Clean Air
Act since it was amended in 1970, most have been primarily con-
cerned with procedural matters. The only substantive issue of great
import concerned the policy of nondegradation which, if anything,
exposed a fundamental flaw in the Clean Air Amendments of 1970.
It was obviously as much a policy of Congress to ensure against the
deterioration of existing air quality as it was to create the national
ambient air quality standards, yet no concrete provision was inserted
into the Act to achieve that goal. The result of this lack of foresight
was that the court in Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus was compelled to
assume the unjudicial task of overseeing, without adequate guidelines
from Congress, a reluctant Administrator's implementation of the non-
degradation policy. Nondegradation is itself an explosive issue be-
cause of its effect upon the possibilities of the relocation of those
industries which contribute heavily to the air pollution problem. If
full meaning is given to Congress's conception of nondegradation as a
firm policy—a policy which simply will not permit any deterioration
of the air through the relocation or modification of industry unless
absolutely all feasible alternatives have been considered—industry will
be virtually compelled to develop the technology necessary for the
abatement of air pollution. Conversely, if resort is had to a watered-
down version of nondegradation, competition may well develop among
the less industrialized states to attract industries which prefer reloca-
tion to the development of control devices, and the stage will be set
for a more serious air pollution crisis in the future when pollution
generating sources will have become entrenched uniformly across the
country. The policy of nondegradation may not seem to be an object
of immediate concern but, it is submitted, its implementation or lack
United States v. Automobile Manufacturers and who are currently plaintiffs in the In
re Motor Vehicle case are New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, New York City, and
two private individuals. Id.; 307 F. Supp. at 618-19.
241 See In re Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equipment, 52 F.R.D. 398 (C.D.
Cal. 1970).
The Heart Disease Foundation, a charitable trust, also used the antitrust theory in
a class action filed in behalf of the entire urban population of the United States, some
125,000,000 persons. Damages were claimed in the amount of 375 trillion dollars. The
court, critical of the "sloppy, scattershot manner in which this complaint was thrown
together," dismissed it. The court noted that the foundation was apparently attempting
to have its case added to the growing multidistrict litigation in California. Heart
Disease Foundation v. General Motors Corp., 463 F.2d 98, 99-101 (2d Cir. 1972). The
foundation also attempted to intervene in Washington v. General Motors Corp., but
the Supreme Court denied its motion. 404 U.S. at 811 (1971).
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thereof will have a direct bearing on the success or failure of the
Clean Air Act as a long-term solution to the air pollution problem.
For this reason, Congress should have had the foresight to have pro-
vided explicit sanctions for the policy of nondegradation in the Clean
Air Act.
The other issues which have been raised in recent litigation re-
garding air pollution and the Clean Air Act are equally if not more
noteworthy, for they underline the importance of construing the pro-
cedural provisions of the Act in a manner consistent with the spirit
of the whole. The liberal provision in section 304 for citizen suits and
the restrictions in section 307 upon judicial review of the EPA Ad-
ministrator's actions were drafted for the express purpose of remedy-
ing the administrative failings encountered under prior legislation.
While section 304 discourages agency inaction by exposing the EPA
to suit by concerned citizens, section 307 protects the EPA, when it
does act, from excessive exposure to suit by those whom the agency
seeks to regulate. These two sections, which govern the judicial treat-
ment of the EPA, differ to such an extent that they might be regarded
as occupying opposite ends of a spectrum, but they both serve the
one purpose of expediting the EPA's administrative process. In this
light, therefore, it should be apparent why the provisions of section
304 ought not to be interpreted in a grudging manner, and why the
restrictions in section 307 have to be given their full force. Thus,
the issues of a plaintiff's standing to bring a section 304 citizen suit
and the award of attorney fees for such an action, although men-
tioned only briefly in Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, should have been
more thoroughly considered by the courts in terms of their relation
with the overall purpose of section 304. It is likewise with the sec-
tion 304 notice requirements discussed in the Riverside case. The
congressional intent behind authorizing citizen suits--that the public
should be encouraged to participate in the enforcement of the Clean
Air Act—will be effectuated only by a broad interpretation of the
statutory language. On the other hand, the deliberate limitations in
section 307 which were placed upon judicial challenges to administra-
tive actions ought not to be circumvented through the employment
of other procedural tactics. Thus, it is regrettable that the plaintiffs
in the Anaconda case were permitted to obtain premature review of
agency action outside the narrow scope of section 307 by persuading
a district court to assume jurisdiction based upon a strained applica-
tion of the Administrative Procedure Act, the National Environmental
Policy Act, and section 304 of the Clean Air Act itself. The Getty
and Kennecott decisions stand in marked contrast, for implicit in
those opinions was a recognition of the mandate of the Clean Air
Act. The plaintiff corporations in those cases also sought to have the
APA and NEPA applied to the EPA's regulatory activity, but the
courts recognized that such a course of action would be not only un-
necessary from a purely legal standpoint, but also extremely onerous
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in a practical sense for an agency such as the EPA. The advances
made by Congress through its enactment of the Clean Air Amend-
ments of 1970 can be preserved only to the extent that they receive
sympathetic treatment at the hands of courts such as that provided
in the Getty and Kennecott cases. It would be unfortunate, and ironic,
if the very provisions of the Act which were designed to expedite the
achievement of a clean environment are to be construed so as to delay
such improvement.
By its own terms, the Clean Air Act is not the sole means for
the vindication of environmental rights, but thus far only two addi-
tional possibilities for the use of the federal courts have been sug-
gested. The first, utilization of the federal common law as applied
to interstate pollution, has been established for public nuisance suits
by the Supreme Court in the Illinois v. City of Milwaukee decision.
It is argued that this doctrine may be utilized by private plaintiffs.
Although the factual situation in Milwaukee involved a state suing a
subdivision of another state, the identity of the parties is not neces-
sarily a relevant factor since the Court's opinion was premised on
its holding that damage caused by interstate pollution raised a fed-
eral question. Theoretically, at least, private plaintiffs may therefore
ground their causes of complaint in the federal common law where
the complained-of pollution is interstate. The federal courts may not
wish to assume jurisdiction over this new and troublesome area; but,
in this writer's opinion, it is inconceivable how the unqualified language
of Illinois v. City of Milwaukee can logically be avoided without being
overruled.
A discussion of the legal ramifications of the Court's holding,
however, may well become academic, for it is possible that even if
private parties are entitled to ground nuisance actions in the federal
common law, they may in reality be prevented from succeeding with
most of their claims. The practical impediment to a successful use
of the federal common law lies in the probability that the federal
courts will require plaintiffs to make a particularized showing that
the complained-of pollution did in fact cross state boundaries. Except
for the relatively few cases where the plaintiff and the defendant are
situated in close proximity but on opposite sides of a state boundary,
most cases will fail due to the simple difficulty of proving that the
specific, complained-of pollution came from another state and caused
the harm. It is therefore doubtful that nuisance actions based on
federal common law will develop as a viable alternative to the use
of the Clean Air Act for injunctive relief and state law for the award
of damages.
The second possibility of obtaining jurisdiction in the federal
court system for compensatory relief from damage caused by air pol-
lution is the use of the federal antitrust laws in suits against the
automobile industry. As mentioned above, the suits which have so
been based have not yet been litigated on the merits, and it is there-
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fore not possible at this time to give an adequate assessment of this
alternative. At any rate, the sheer problem of sustaining the burden
of proof, as to the issue of whether the alleged conspiracy on the
part of the automobile industry did interfere with the defendants' rights,
seems insurmountable. The inevitable conclusion appears to be that
there is no real alternative, on the federal level, to the utilization of
the remedies provided in the Clean Air Act. Even if the two possibili-
ties discussed here were practicable, they would not be as effective a
means of combating air pollution as is the comprehensive regulatory
scheme of the Clean Air Act.
EDWARD J. M. LITTLE
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